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This Article examines the unique dialogic relationship that exists
between the Supreme Courtand Congress concerningpatent law.
In most areas of the law, Congress and the Supreme Court
engage directly with each other to craft legal rules. When it comes
to patent law, however, Congress and the Court often interact via
an intermediary institution: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. In patent law, dialogue often begins when
Congress or the Supreme Court acts as a dialogic catalyst,
signaling reform priorities to which the Federal Circuit often
responds.
Appreciating the unique nature of patent dialogue has important
implications for patent law in particularand for all legal areas
with specialized courts more generally. Encouraging the
Supreme Court and Congress to debate patentpolicy through the
Federal Circuit situates law making at the institution most
capable of crafting efficient legal rules. Additionally, the Federal
Circuit'sparticipationin the dialogue over patent law and policy
can reduce many of the drawbacks of specialized adjudication,
namely tunnel vision, doctrinal ossification, and power
expansion.
But policy dialogue with a specialized court also involves unique
supervisory and catalytic roles for the Supreme Court and
Congress. Thus, while "patent dialogue" holds out the promise
of increased institutional input regarding patent reform, the
Supreme Court and Congress must develop new methods of
catalyzing the Federal Circuit to action and of overseeing the
Federal Circuit's responsiveness to policy signals.
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INTRODUCTION

Across a variety of legal fields, scholars have studied how the
three branches of government engage each other in a form of
"governance as dialogue."' In patent law, such interbranch dialogue is
1. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577,
580-81 (1993) (arguing that the judicial function is best understood in terms of
constitutional dialogue).
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complicated by the presence of a powerful, specialized court: the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("the Federal Circuit"). 2
This Article describes and analyzes how dialogue operates in patent
law-specifically, how Congress and the Supreme Court leverage the
unique nature of the Federal Circuit in order to shape the law of
patents.
The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over all appeals arising
under the patent laws of the United States.' The court has become a
powerful institution in patent policy. The Federal Circuit's control of
patent law began almost immediately upon its founding in 1982.
During the first two decades of the court's existence, the two
institutions that had previously dominated patent law-the Supreme
Court and Congress-demonstrated little interest in substantive
patent law.4 From 1982 until 2001, the Supreme Court heard only ten
patent cases,' addressing substantive patent issues in only two. 6
2. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court,2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (referring to the Federal Circuit as "the de facto supreme court of
patents"); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of JudicialPerformance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2004) ("In
the last two decades, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
become, by far, the most powerful and influential force in the U.S. patent system."
(footnotes omitted)).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012) (listing cases falling under the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction). There are some patent-related appeals over which the Federal Circuit does
not have jurisdiction; for instance, when the patent issue is pleaded only as a defense, see
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988), or when patent
issues arise only in counterclaims, see Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830, 834 (2002).
4. See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 522 (2010) ("The Court's level of interest in the patent system
dropped even further immediately after the creation of the Federal Circuit."); Janis, supra
note 2, at 387; Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1238 (2012) (stating that
Congress has largely delegated responsibility for interpretation of the patent statute to the
courts).
5. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999) (concerning whether a federal statute abrogating a state's sovereign immunity
in patent infringement cases is constitutional); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152
(1999) (concerning the standard of review for Patent & Trademark Office board appeals);
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 57 (1998) (concerning the on-sale bar); WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (concerning the doctrine
of equivalents); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)
(concerning whether patent claim construction is a question of law for the court); Cardinal
Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 85 (1993) (concerning counterclaims of patent
invalidity); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 663-64 (1990) (concerning
premarketing activity for FDA compliance and patent infringement); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143 (1989) (concerning preemption); Christianson
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 803-04 (1988) (concerning jurisdiction);
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Congress's single foray into patent law during that time dealt
primarily with procedural issues at the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office ("PTO").' Similarly, Congress made virtually no substantive
changes to patent law between 1952 and 2011.8
The Federal Circuit's influence over patent law and policy has
been a rich source of study for academics. Scholars have developed a
valuable and voluminous literature concerning the proper role of the
Federal Circuit within the institutional dynamics of patent law.9 While

Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 810 (1986) (concerning Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a)); see also Duffy, supra note 4, at 539 fig.8 (listing patent cases in which the
Supreme Court granted certiorari).
6. Pfaff,525 U.S. at 57 (concerning the on-sale bar); Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S.
at 21 (concerning the doctrine of equivalents); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as
"Prime Percolator":A Prescriptionfor Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56
UCLA L. Rev. 657, 723 tbl. (2009). Since 2001, the Supreme Court has become much
more interested in patent law. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court's
Interestin PatentLaw, 3 IP Theory 62, 63-64 (2013); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the
Supreme Court's grants and denials of certiorari over patent law cases).
7. See American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-552
(1999) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The Act made one substantive change
to patent law by creating a "first inventor" defense for users of business method patents.
Id. § 4302 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)). That change is discussed in
more detail infra Part IV.C.
8. See Rai, supra note 4, at 1237-38 (discussing statutory patent reforms from 1952 to
2011).
9. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 60-61 (2009) (arguing that the Federal Circuit applies the law
differently across different types of technology and that the district courts have followed
accordingly); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1674-75 (2003) (same); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit
Can Learn from the Supreme Court-and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 787-90
(2010) (analyzing the historical development of the Federal Circuit and the concerns over
its specialized role); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The
Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 813-14 (2008) (proposing
solutions at the Supreme Court level to recent problematic developments); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 74 (1989) (finding the Federal Circuit has improved uniformity, predictability, and
policy implementation, while creating procedural problems); John F. Duffy, The Festo
Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SuP. Cr. REV.
273, 284 (noting that the Federal Circuit can signal and illuminate cases that most require
review to the Supreme Court); Golden, supra note 6, at 657-58; Gary M. Hoffman &
Robert L. Kinder, Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases - Placing the
Recent Scrutiny in Context and Determiningif it will Continue, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 227-29 (2010) (examining recent Supreme Court scrutiny of the
Federal Circuit and assessing their future relationship); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law,
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV.
1, 2 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court has allowed the Federal Circuit to
fundamentally alter patent law); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
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the literature primarily focuses on the Supreme Court's ability to
intervene doctrinally in patent law,o scholars have identified a host of
other potential institutional competitors for the court, including
federal district courts," federal circuit courts, 2 state courts,13 the
PTOl4 and other administrative agencies," Congress,'" and the
IMPRESSIONS 28, 28 (2007), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/106/eisenberg.pdf
("[T]he Federal Circuit is, for all practical purposes, the parent in charge.").
10. See supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, District Courts as Patent Laboratories,1 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 307, 319-22 (2011) (proposing specialized patent district courts); Kimberly A.
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 1, 39 (2001) (same); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise
on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 877 (2002) (same); William C. Rooklidge &
Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal Circuit's Discomfort with Its
Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 726 (2000) (examining the expanding role
of the Federal Circuit).
12. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1664-67 (2007) (proposing "debate" of patent law
between the Federal Circuit and other circuit courts of appeals).
13. See Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Uniformity in
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 298-302 (2003) (explaining how
state courts can review patent decisions and substantively intervene with the Federal
Circuit's decisions); Mark J. Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases: A Cry for Help to
the FederalCircuit, 101 DICK. L. REV. 41, 48-59 (1996) (looking at how patent issues arise
in state courts cases for non-payment of patent royalties and describing the difficulties
state courts have in deciding patent issues); Paul R. Michel & Meredith Martin Addy,
State and Federal Court Adjudication of FederalPatent Issues, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW 1410 (Donald S. Chisum et al. eds., 1998); Sean B. Seymore, The Competency of
State Courts to Adjudicate Patent-BasedMalpractice Claims, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 443, 464, 47585 (2006) (discussing when state courts can review patent issues and the relationship
between substantive patent law issues and state tort law).
14. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A
Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2008) (proposing creation of an
executive branch position to supervise innovation policy); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti
K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative
Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 272 (2007) (examining the deference afforded to the PTO as an
administrative entity); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1747, 1747 (2011) (arguing that Congress should grant the PTO rule-making authority);
John M. Golden, PatentableSubject Matter and InstitutionalChoice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041,
1051 (2011) (suggesting that the PTO is a weak administrative agency but arguing that it
should be entrusted with more policy-making authority); Sapna Kumar, The Accidental
Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 229 (2013) (analyzing the Federal Circuit's role as a policy
maker and suggesting a pending showdown between the Supreme Court and Congress, in
which the Federal Circuit is caught); Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency:
The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 Mo. L. REV. 733, 754-57 (2011) (analyzing the PTO's
potential for patent policy making); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent
Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1984-89 (2013)
(analyzing the potential analysis of post-grant review under Chevron).
15. See, e.g., Rai, supranote 4, at 1239-42.
16. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Congress as Catalyst, 63 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
Apr. 2014) (manuscript at 7) (arguing that legislative proposals often "catalyze" the
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Solicitor General." The literature's focus on institutional doctrinal
competition, however, has obscured the ways in which institutions can
(and do) engage with each other in a form of "dialogue" regarding
patent law and policy.
This Article examines the challenges and promises of the unique
dialogic relationship that arises in doctrinal areas overseen by a
specialized court of appeals. In doing so, this Article builds on
insights from the "governance as dialogue" movement." Dialogic
theory suggests that all three branches of government "interact
constantly to shape and influence the laws under which Americans
live."" Courts, for their part, engage in a "continual colloquy" with
the more political branches of government.' Traditional dialogic
theory focuses on interactions between Congress and the Supreme

Federal Circuit to revisit its patent jurisprudence); Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the
United States: Lessons Learned, REGULATION, Winter 2012-2013, at 20, 22 (noting that
pressing issues before Congress have been "rendered moot by judicial resolution"); Paul
R. Gugliuzza, The FederalCircuits as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1857
(2013) (noting that the Federal Circuit has opposed legislative proposals affecting its
jurisdiction).
17. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 4, at 550 (arguing that the Solicitor General is the "de
facto 'competitor' " to the Federal Circuit in patent cases at the Supreme Court).
18. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 254 (2d ed. 1986) (arguing that courts must
engage in "continual colloquy" with the more political branches of government); LOUIS
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS
(1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court does not have the sole responsibility for
constitutional interpretation, but rather is part of a larger dialogue); CHARLES GARDNER
GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006) (exploring the institutional norms shielding the
judiciary from encroachment by Congress and their effect on judicial independence);
GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL
POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003) (analyzing the role of the judicial branch
in democratic dialogue, suggesting that legislators invite judges to make policy); MARK C.
MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2009) (surveying Court-Congress
interactions); id. at 5-12 (surveying "governance as dialogue" literature); J. MITCHELL
PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004) (analyzing the effect of judicial review on the
legislative process); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (arguing that congressional-Court
relations occur in a complex milieu of interbranch relations); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/PresidentCivil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 613 (1991) (same); Friedman, supra note 1, at 580-81 (arguing that the judicial
function is best understood in terms of constitutional dialogue).
19. ROGER H. DAVIDSON, WALTER J. OLESZEK & FRANCES E. LEE, CONGRESS
AND ITS MEMBERS 369 (13th ed. 2012).
20. BICKEL, supranote 18, at 254.
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Court. 2 1 For example, when the Supreme Court interprets a statute, it
invites Congress to review that interpretation. In response, Congress
may choose to acquiesce to the Court's interpretation, or it may
choose to modify the statute to codify a different interpretation: a socalled "legislative override." 22 These back-and-forth interpretive
actions form the basis for Court-Congress dialogue.
In contrast, institutional dialogue in patent law often involves the
Federal Circuit, a mid-level appellate court. Oftentimes, dialogue in
patent law begins when Congress or the Supreme Court acts as a
signaler, identifying areas of the law that are out of step with
perceived policy needs.23 When Congress or the Supreme Court
initiates dialogue, the Federal Circuit can respond through a variety
of means. Once the Federal Circuit reacts, or suggests a change to the
law, the signaler has several choices in how to respond. First, it can
accept or acquiesce to the Federal Circuit's suggested change.
Second, Congress or the Court can reject the Federal Circuit's
suggested change by legislative override or judicial reversal. Lastly,
the signaler can choose to continue the discussion by signaling to the
Federal Circuit that its suggested change is insufficient, while leaving
the law intact.
Why does the Court-Congress dialogue in patent law often occur
through interactions with an appellate court whereas in other areas of
the law dialogue flows more directly between Congress and the
Supreme Court? This Article argues that patent dialogue occurs this
way largely because of the centralization of patent appeals at the
Federal Circuit. Centralization has created a court that has both the
incentive and ability to engage directly with other institutions in
shaping patent law and policy. Because the work of judges on the
Federal Circuit is acutely impacted by legal interventions from other
21. See generally supra note 18 (listing sources discussing the "governance as
dialogue" movement).
22. See Eskridge, OverridingSupreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, supra
note 18, at 332.
23. Of course, this is not always the way that dialogue begins. At times, Congress can
react to the Federal Circuit by legislatively overruling decisions by the court. See, e.g., In re
Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing a decision by the
PTO after determining that it exceeded its statutory authority by basing its decision solely
on prior art previously considered by the PTO), superseded by statute, 21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13105,
116 Stat. 1758, 1900 (2002) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012)) as recognized in In re
Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 576-77 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2002). This form of dialogue-known as a
legislative override-has been the source of much of the "governance as dialogue"
movement. See generally supra note 18 (listing sources discussing the "governance as
dialogue" movement).
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institutional actors, the court is keenly aware of those actors' actions.
Whereas generalist appellate courts cannot hope to stay abreast of
every legal change that occurs within their jurisdictional ambit, the
Federal Circuit need only follow changes in a few legal areas.24
Furthermore, because of the centralization of patent appeals, the
Federal Circuit has numerous opportunities to change the law
formally. Even if generalist appellate courts were keen to alter the
law in a particular area, they might have to wait years for the proper
case to come before them. Not so with a court that hears over 600
patent cases every year.' Lastly, theory suggests that specialized
courts will seek to maintain and increase influence in their area of
specialization.2 6 Thus, the Federal Circuit has an incentive to be the
first mover in the market for patent policy. Indeed, this Article's
conclusions suggest that specialized courts' ability to preempt other
potential institutional policy makers is an under-recognized
consequence of specialized adjudication generally.
Dialogic policy making involving the Federal Circuit, when used
judiciously, holds out promise for an improved process for creating
patent doctrine. By leveraging the advantages of specialized judicial
review while minimizing the drawbacks of such specialization,
dialogue has the potential to greatly improve patent policy making.
Because the Federal Circuit has more expertise with and knowledge
of patent law than other institutions, it is often desirable to have the
court make a first attempt at law making. Initiating dialogue about
that law making allows other institutions (Congress, the Supreme
Court, as well as the executive branch27 ) to identify doctrinal areas
24. The Federal Circuit does supervise other areas of the law, including veterans'
affairs, trademark registration appeals, and appeals from the merit systems protection
board. See Appeals Filed,by Category FY2012, U.S. Cr. APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT
(2012) [hereinafter Appeals Filed, by Category], http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images
/stories/the-court/statistics/Caseload-byCategoryAppealsFiled_2012.pdf. Despite this
jurisdictional diversity, nearly half of the court's time and attention is devoted to patent
law. See id.
25. See Historical Caseload, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT (Dec. 10,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/CaseloadOverall
2012),
1983-2012_REV.pdf (calculating 1,381 cases in fiscal year 2012, forty-five percent of
which were patent cases); see also Appeals Filed, by Category, supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 54 (2011) (describing
the preference of specialized courts to enlarge their jurisdiction); RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 245 (1996) (noting the Federal
Circuit's increase of jurisdiction at the expense of the regional courts of appeals).
27. This Article focuses on dialogic interactions between the Federal Circuit and
Congress and the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. It does not focus on interactions
between the executive branch and the Federal Circuit because of the hierarchical
differences between the dialogic interactions described in this Article (in which the
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that are out of step with current policy goals. Thus, indirect law
making can lead to increased expertise in decision making while
minimizing tunnel vision, doctrinal ossification, and other assorted
problems associated with specialized courts.
The theory of Court-Congress dialogue that this Article
describes sheds new light on how Congress and the Supreme Court
can monitor and influence patent law short of creating new legal
rules. For example, viewed through a dialogic lens, many recent
Supreme Court patent cases that provide general standards but fail to
provide specific legal rules have been subject to scholarly critique.28
However, criticizing the Court for failing to articulate coherent rules
may miss the point when viewed through a dialogic lens; writing
opinions that enunciate broad standards rather than clear rules allows
the Supreme Court to engage the Federal Circuit in dialogue, rather
than simply correcting for doctrinal errors.29 This form of decision
making may be preferable when the appellate court being reviewed is
a specialized court. Indeed, the Supreme Court can shape patent law
without issuing any opinion whatsoever. Actions such as granting
requests for certiorari and requesting views of the U.S. Solicitor
General generate doctrinal responses at the Federal Circuit. Congress
enjoys similar (albeit underutilized) means for shaping patent law,
without having to formally alter the patent statute.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches the dialogic
model for patent law. As an introduction, this Part provides an
overview of the literature on dialogic theory. Then, it models the
dialogue that occurs between the judicial and legislative branches in
patent law. It concludes by contrasting patent dialogue with dialogue
in other legal areas.

Federal Circuit is constitutionally bound to follow congressional statutes and Supreme
Court case law) and interactions involving the executive branch's primary patent policymaking institution, the PTO. The Federal Circuit reviews decisions from the PTO and
does not afford Chevron deference to the agencies decisions. For those interested in the
unique dynamics of the relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit, see
generally Benjamin & Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, supra note
14. Arti Rai has written more broadly about the executive branch's policy role in patent
law beyond the PTO. See generally Rai, supra note 4 (discussing the executive branch's
role in patent policy).
28. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and Still No
Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunityto
Return PatentLaw to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289,1305 (2011) (stating
that following the Supreme Court's Bilski decision, "courts will be left to deal with the
fallout from the absence of effective guidance").
29. See infra Part II.B.
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Part II provides descriptive support for the theoretical model of
Part I. In doing so, this Part examines recent examples of interinstitutional dialogue. First, it traces back-and-forth policy debates
between Congress and the Federal Circuit during the recent period of
legislative patent reform. Then, it evaluates the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, focusing on the high
Court's recent tendency to enunciate broad standards rather than
specific legal rules when deciding patent cases.
Part III elaborates by cataloging the Federal Circuit's responses
to policy signals from the Supreme Court and Congress. As observed
from the interactions described in Part II, the Federal Circuit's
response mechanisms can be grouped into three relatively distinct
categories: judicial review, direct advocacy, and instruction to lowerlevel institutions.
Part IV examines two questions that emerge from examination of
patent dialogue, both of which are also fundamental to the study of
specialized courts. First, why does the Federal Circuit play such a
prominent role in dialogue that should, according to traditional
dialogic theory, occur primarily between the Supreme Court and
Congress? Second, when is it preferential for policy making to occur
with input from the Federal Circuit, and when is the more direct form
of Court-Congress dialogue preferable? This Part concludes by
proposing ways to improve future interbranch dialogue in patent law.
I. A DIALOGIC MODEL FOR PATENT LAW

A.

Dialogic Theory
The U.S. Constitution grants separate and distinct powers to the
three branches of government: to Congress, the Constitution grants
the power to create federal laws;30 to the executive, it grants the
power to execute those laws;' to the judiciary, it grants the power to
review cases arising under those laws." The separation of powers
between the branches encompasses the notion that distinct functions

30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. That power is limited to some extent by the executive
branch's veto power. Id. § 7, cl. 2.
31. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."); see also id. § 3 (The President "shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.").
32. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
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are maintained by distinct governmental bodies, each body "in its
own area, none to operate in the realm assigned to another.""
However, the distinction between the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches' respective powers is not so stark as to foreclose
interbranch dialogue regarding interpretation of laws. For example,
courts (often the Supreme Court) and Congress engage in a form of
dialogue when federal statutes are challenged as unconstitutional.3 4
Courts have the power to strike down federal legislation as
unconstitutional35 and use this power with some frequency.3 6 In
response to a court declaring a statute unconstitutional, Congress may
attempt to either enact legislation or amend the Constitution in order
to "override" that judicial decision.37 For instance, on various
occasions Congress has proposed constitutional amendments
outlawing flag burning in order to override the Supreme Court's
decision that flag burning is speech protected by the First
Amendment.3 8 However, because of the high hurdle that Congress
33. Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine"of Separation of Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592, 593 (1986).
34. See generally PICKERILL, supra note 18 (describing the process by which the
language of court opinions influences the content of legislation and congressional
deliberation).
35. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
36. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down
section 4(b) of the 1968 Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional); Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (striking down certain provisions of the 2002
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act as unconstitutional); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
602 (2000) (removing the civil rights provisions of the Violence Against Women Act as an
unconstitutional expansion of the U.S. Commerce Clause and remedial powers of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-34 (1997) (striking
down provisions of the Brady Act as unconstitutionally commandeering state executive
officers).
37. William Eskridge defines a congressional override as a statute that "(1)
completely overrules the holding of a statutory interpretation decision, just as a
subsequent Court would overrule an unsatisfactory precedent; (2) modifies the result of a
decision in some material way .. . ; or (3) modifies the consequences of the decision . .. ."
Eskridge, OverridingSupreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, supra note 18, at
332 n.1; see, e.g., Carl Hulse, Flag Amendment Narrowly Fails in Senate Vote, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/washington/28flag.html (reporting on
a proposed constitutional amendment that would overturn the Supreme Court's decision
granting First Amendment protection to flag burning); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 12-13 (1982) (stating that a Supreme Court
ruling that a law is unconstitutional is an invitation to amend the Constitution and that
reversal of some constitutional decisions is desirable).
38. Mike Allen, House Passes ConstitutionalAmendment to Ban Flag Burning,WASH.
POST (June 23, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/22
/AR2005062202155.html. Constitutional amendments to ban flag burning have passed the
House of Representatives on numerous occasions. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 10, 109th Cong.
(2005).
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faces in amending the Constitution,3 9 courts' constitutional
pronouncements usually remain unchallenged in Congress.40
Unlike judicial decisions concerning the constitutionality of
federal statutes, Congress can override judicial interpretations of
federal statutes passing clarifying legislation. Due to the relative ease
with which Congress can modify legislation, Congress overrides
judicial interpretation of its statutory provisions with some
frequency.4 1 For example, in 2009 Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act,42 which reestablished the statute of limitations for filing
an equal-pay discrimination lawsuit with each paycheck affected by
discriminatory action.43 The Act was a direct response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.," which

fixed the statute of limitations upon receipt of the initial
discriminatory paycheck.45
Jeb Barnes describes the idealized pluralistic dialogic modelwhich begins with judicial interpretation of statutes followed by a
reaction (or acquiescence) from Congress-thusly:
If litigation reveals statutory flaws, or produces objectionable
judicial interpretations, interest groups can appeal to Congress,
which can scrutinize the courts' decisions and revise the original
statute in light of lessons learned from litigation."
Much of the dialogic theory literature follows Barnes's framing of
Court-Congress dialogue: courts initiate interpretive debates by
giving meaning to statutory text; Congress then has the option of

39. Constitutional amendments require the vote of two-thirds of Congress and threequarters of the state legislatures. U.S. CONST. art. V.
40. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? PoliticalPolarization,the Supreme Court,
and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 211 (2013) ("But the very difficult supermajority
requirements for a constitutional amendment ... usually leaves the Court's constitutional
decisions standing.").
41. Id. at 209 (finding that congressional overrides of statutory Supreme Court
decisions occurred twelve times per congressional term, on average, between 1975 and
1990). Hasen notes that the frequency of overrides has significantly dropped since 2001.
Id.
42. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 2009) and at 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2012)).
43. Id. § 3 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. 2009)).
44. 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
45. Id. at 621.
46. JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES,
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 6 (2004).
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either overriding the court's interpretation or accepting the court's
interpretation. 47
Legislative overrides are not the only form of dialogue between
Congress and the courts, however.4 For example, Congress can
respond positively to a court case interpreting a congressional statute
by codifying the case. Alternatively, members of Congress can
comment publicly on the Court's decisions. Indeed, one empirical
study found that fifty-four percent of Supreme Court tax cases have
been mentioned by name by legislators in a formal legislative
context.4 9 Congress also interacts directly with the judicial branch
during nomination proceedings. 0 During such proceedings, members
of Congress can express to future Justices their support or displeasure
for Supreme Court rulings, while also performing a signaling function
to the current Court. Also, Congress can threaten to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts." Congress rarely carries through
with such threats,5 2 but the threat of legislation provides a platform
from which to express dissent with a court's legal interpretation.
47. See supra note 23; see also Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges
Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 790-92 (1963) (discussing
the judicial involvement in statutory interpretation); Ruth B. Ginsburg, A Plea for
Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 995 (1987) (discussing "the failure of Congress
to review and revise statutes that slip from the [circuit courts'] grasp"); Ruth B. Ginsburg
& Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (1987)
(proposing ways to "achieve greater uniformity and coherence in the application of federal
law"); Carl McGowan, The View from an Inferior Court, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 659, 665
(1982) (discussing interactions between the courts and Congress regarding the abolition of
diversity jurisdiction).
48. Nancy Staudt, Ren6 Lindstadt, and Jason O'Conner have quantified the dialogic
relationship of the Court and Congress. They find that only thirty-six percent of CourtCongress interactions regarding tax statutes are legislative overrides. Nancy C. Staudt,
Ren6 Lindstidt & Jason O'Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional
Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-2005,82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340,1343 (2007).
49. Id. at 1352-53.
50. See, e.g., Senator Arlen Specter, Concluding Address: On the Confirmation of a
Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1045 (1990) ("In my judgment ... judicial
philosophy is an appropriate subject for in-depth questioning by the Judiciary
Committee.").
51. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1500-01 (1990) (noting that the "jurisdiction stripping ... could at
any moment get put back on [the congressional agenda]"). See generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-StrippingReconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043 (2010) (discussing
jurisdiction-stripping in the post-Boumediene era); Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the
Constitution,and the Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit
of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 389 (1983) (looking at the
relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court, and specifically "Congress' power
to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction").
52. For example, conservative lawmakers introduced bills to strip the federal courts of
jurisdiction over school prayer cases after the Supreme Court disallowed prayer in public
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Although the "governance as dialogue" movement encompasses
a wide variety of specific approaches, the literature is grounded in the
view that legislative and judicial functions operate in the context of a
complex and continuous conversation between the legislative and
judicial branches."
B.

Patent Dialogue

Court-Congress dialogue in patent law has taken on a decidedly
different shape than other areas of the law. For the first twenty years
after Congress created the Federal Circuit, Congress and the
Supreme Court largely ignored patent law.54 But times have changed.
As the value of technological innovations has increased, so too has
the economic importance of patents. Major companies now make
corporate acquisitions largely for the patent portfolios involved." Not
coincidentally, legislative, judicial, and executive branch interest in
patent law has also increased during that time.56 For example, in 2011,
Congress passed the most sweeping reform of patent law in over fifty
years: the America Invents Act ("AIA").7 Most significantly, the
AIA changed the U.S. patent system from a "first-to-invent" system
to a "first-to-file" system, fundamentally altering the way in which the

schools on First Amendment grounds. See S. 88, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 525, 98th Cong.
(1983); H.R. 253, 98th Cong. (1983).
53. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 9 ("[M]ost works from [the governance as dialogue]
movement reject the notion of either total legislative supremacy or total judicial
supremacy in favor of a much more complicated and nuanced, continuous process of
interaction among the institutions."). Similarly, the executive and legislative branches
engage in a form of dialogue regarding legal interpretation. For example, in the modern
administrative state, the President has substantial power to "make law" when he directs
administrative agencies to prescribe rules in the interstices of broad statutory directives.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 220 (1994). Congress, of course, can choose to amend its
statutes in response to administrative rule making. As noted earlier, the executive-judicial
dialogue in patent law is outside of the scope of this Article due to the structural
differences between the executive-judicial relationship and legislative-judicial relationship
in patent law.
54. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
55. For instance, Google's $12.5 billion acquisition of Motorola "would probably not
have [happened]" if not for Motorola's attractive patent portfolio and Google's relative
lack of one. Jay Greene, Yes, Google Needed Motorola for the Patents, CNET (Apr. 5,
2012, 10:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023 3-57409828-93/yes-google-neededmotorola-for-the-patents/ (conducting an interview with Google's deputy general counsel,
Allen Lo).
56. For more on the executive branch's current role in patent policy, see generally
Rai, supra note 4 (discussing the executive branch's involvement in policy development).
57. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 282 (2012)).
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patent system treats inventive activity." Among other substantive
changes to patent law, the AIA expanded the definition of prior art
used in patentability determinations, eliminated tax strategy patents,
established prior user rights, and significantly diminished the
importance of the best mode requirement.5 9
The Supreme Court is also more interested in patent law than
ever before.' The Court has recently ruled on issues ranging from the
patent-eligibility of business methods,61 diagnostic testing,62 and
DNA,' to the scope of the nonobviousness requirement.' Those and
other recent rulings have limited the types of inventions eligible for
patenting,' have restricted the use of injunctions in patent cases,6
and have reaffirmed the clear and convincing evidence standard for
patent invalidity.' The Supreme Court's renewed interest in patent
law has not only attracted the attention of legal scholars, but has been
prominently reported in the popular press as well.68
The AIA and the recent increase in the Supreme Court patent
cases demonstrate newfound engagement by Congress and the Court
with substantive patent law. Despite these changes, however, the
most important changes to the patent system in recent years have
been the result of the Federal Circuit reacting to policy signals from

58. First-to-invent systems reward a patent to the first person to develop a patentable
invention, regardless of whether that person was the first person to file for a patent. Firstto-file systems reward the patent to the first person to patent. Rob Merges has described
the AIA as a "first-inventor-to-file" system because it has the structure of a first-to-file
system, but it has a grace period of up to one year to protect first inventors. Robert P.
Merges, Priorityand Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1028 (2012).
59. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, §§ 3(b)(1), 14, 15, 125 Stat. at 285, 327-28
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 282 (2012)).
60. See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 63.
61. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3222 (2010).
62. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
63. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120
(2013).
64. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,426-27 (2007).
65. See supranotes 61-63.
66. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
67. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2252 (2011).
68. See, e.g., Jon Healey, Angelina Jolie, the Supreme Court and Gene Patents, L.A.
TIMES (May 14, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/14/news/la-ol-angelina-joliegene-patents-20130514 (discussing celebrity headlines and the Supreme Court's
consideration of "whether a gene sequence can be patented"); Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court Supports Monsanto in Seed-Replication Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/business/monsanto-victorious-in-genetic-seedcase.html (reporting on the Supreme Court's decision concerning genetically altered
soybean patents).
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the Supreme Court and Congress.69 The Federal Circuit's reaction to
congressional policy signals exemplifies what this Article calls "patent
dialogue." This Part sketches the contours of patent dialogue before
proceeding to support the theory through recent examples of dialogic
interactions in patent law in Part II.
1. Comparing Patent Dialogue to Traditional Dialogues Between
Courts and Congress
In patent law, dialogue often begins when Congress or the
Supreme Court acts as a signaler, identifying areas of patent law that
are out of step with policy concerns. In essence, Congress or the
Supreme Court can send signals to the Federal Circuit regarding
those areas of the Federal Circuit's case law that are in need of
updating. These policy signals can take many forms, as described
more fully in Part II20 In general, however, policy signals consist of
any action by Congress or the Supreme Court that identifies doctrinal
areas in need of change. Examples of policy signals include proposing
patent reform legislation or granting certiorari on a fundamental
question of patent law.
The Federal Circuit can respond in various ways. For instance,
the Federal Circuit can issue opinions that attempt to align patent
doctrine better with the policy goals identified by Congress or the
Supreme Court. While issuing precedential opinions is the most
familiar way for the Federal Circuit to respond, it is not the only way.
The Federal Circuit has a range of other potential responses,
including instructing lower tribunals (district courts, the international
trade commission, the PTO, etc.) about procedural improvements
that will further the identified policy goals. Similarly, the Federal
Circuit can engage in direct conversation with Congress or the
Supreme Court through a variety of means, including direct advocacy,
testifying before Congress, and public speeches.
However the Federal Circuit chooses to react, the signaler
(Congress or the Supreme Court) can then continue the dialogue in a
variety of ways. First, it can accept or acquiesce to the Federal
Circuit's suggested change, usually by doing nothing. This occurs
anytime the Federal Circuit alters the law with no subsequent

69. See Burk, supra note 16, at 22 (arguing that the most important result of the AIA
are areas of law that the Federal Circuit addressed before congressional action was
necessary).
70. See infra Part II.
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response from Congress." For a Supreme Court with a full docket
and a Congress working on a host of legal issues, this is usually, but
not always, the chosen option. A second option is for Congress or the
Court to reject the Federal Circuit's suggested change by legislative
override or judicial reversal.72 Lastly, the signaler can choose to
continue the discussion by signaling to the Federal Circuit that its
suggested change is insufficient while leaving the law intact.73
Patent dialogue differs in fundamental ways from traditional
dialogic relationships. For example, the Supreme Court's dialogic role
in patent law may differ from its role in other areas of the law. In the
traditional model, the Supreme Court initiates dialogue by
interpreting statutory or constitutional text.74 In patent law, on the
other hand, John Golden has identified instances in which the
Supreme Court acts as a policy "percolator."75 In this role, the
Supreme Court reviews the Federal Circuit's decisions not to settle
circuit splits, but rather to send signals to the Federal Circuit
regarding areas of doctrinal ossification.76
Patent dialogue also frequently differs from traditional notions of
Court-Congress dialogue in that debates often begin at a high level of
interpretive authority (Congress or the Supreme Court) and then
travel to a lower interpretive level (the Federal Circuit). In the
traditional model, courts initiate the dialogue by interpreting
statutory or constitutional text. Patent dialogue, on the other hand,
often begins when Congress or the Supreme Court indicates a policy
preference by some means other than creating new law. This
difference largely stems from (1) the Federal Circuit's position in the
institutional hierarchy of patent law and (2) the patent statute's
71. For instance, the Federal Circuit altered the law on written description in Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has indicated that it wants to revisit that decision.
72. For instance, the Supreme Court has reversed the Federal Circuit numerous times
in recent years regarding the Federal Circuit's doctrine on patent-eligible subject matter.
See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111
(2013) (affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the Federal Circuit); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (reversing the
judgment of the Federal Circuit); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)
("[N]othing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing interpretations of § 101 that
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past.").
73. For suggestions on how Congress and the Supreme Court could more effectively
signal the continuing need for legal change to the Federal Circuit, see infra Part IV.C.
74. Scholars have developed a variety of doctrines designed to enable the Supreme
Court to avoid initiating interpretive dialogue with Congress. See generally BICKEL, supra
note 18 (extolling the "passive virtues" which permit dialogic avoidance).
75. See Golden, supra note 6, at 662-64
76. Id. at 662.
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relative vagueness." Much like the Sherman Act, the Patent Act
requires judges to engage in common law-like decision making.78
Because of this, Congress largely takes a supervisory role in the
process of crafting rules to fill in the interstices of the statute.7 9
Similarly, the Supreme Court generally delegates rule making to the
Federal Circuit due to that court's superior expertise with patent
law." Thus, the need to provide common law development places
Congress and the Supreme Court in a supervisory role, intervening
when the law develops contrary to the policies underlying the
statutory scheme.
Patent dialogue also differs from the traditional dialogic model in
the identity of the reactionary institution. In the traditional model,
Congress is the reactor, choosing to either override the Supreme
Court's interpretive decision or to leave the Court's decision in
place." In patent law, however, the Federal Circuit is the reacting
institution. The Federal Circuit, through a variety of means described
in Part II.B, can "suggest" legal reforms designed to carry out the
policy signals sent from the Supreme Court or Congress. The Federal
Circuit's prominent presence in dialogue is largely due to its exclusive
jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent laws, an issue more
fully explored in Part IV.
Patent dialogue does, however, resemble the traditional model in
the response step. The initiator of dialogue can either acquiesce to the
suggestions made by the reactor, or it can overrule that suggestion.
The table below compares the two dialogic models.

77. See Dreyfuss, In Search of InstitutionalIdentity: The FederalCircuit Comes of Age,
supranote 9, at 801 ("[Tlhe Patent Act bears some resemblance to the Sherman Act: it has
always depended on common law elaboration."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) ("The statute books are full of laws, of which
the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of
common law."). See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-112 (Supp. 2013) (exhibiting the vagueness
of patent law codification).
78. Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV.
51, 53 (2010) ("[T]he patent code ... is a common law enabling statute." (footnotes
omitted)).
79. See infra Part II.A.
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. See supra Part I.A.
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Table 1: Traditional Dialogic Model vs. Patent Dialogic Model

Catalyst
Supreme Court:

Reaction
Congress:

Response
Supreme Court:

Traditional

Model

Interprets a
statutory or
constitutional
text
Congress or the

Patent
Dialogue

1. Overrides
(statute),
2. Accepts, or
3. Continues
dialogue
Federal Circuit:

Congress or the

Supreme Court:

Supreme Court:
Signals policy
goals

Interprets new
statute or
amendment

1. Alters case
law,
2. Instructs
district
courts/PTO, or
3. Lobbies
Congress or
Supreme

1. Overrides
(statute/case
law),
2. Accepts, or
3. Continues
dialogue

Court

2. The Federal Circuit as Dialogic Partner
The model of patent dialogue outlined above envisions a large
policy-making role for the Federal Circuit; the court must convert the
policy signals sent by Congress or the Supreme Court into legal rules.
But why would Congress or the Supreme Court delegate policymaking functions to the Federal Circuit?'
One answer might be that Congress and the Supreme Court
recognize the Federal Circuit as an expert body. Congress created the
Federal Circuit in order to interpret the vague contours of the patent
statute.83 Simultaneously, Congress chose not to grant rule making
authority to the PTO. In doing so, Congress clearly intended to

82. Scholars have devoted great attention to the benefits of such a relationship to the
Federal Circuit. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
83. 128 CONG. REC. S14, 692 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1981) (statement of Sen. Robert Dole)
(outlining the need to reform the "doctrinal confusion" in patent law); see also Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 124, 96 Stat. 25, 36 (1982)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §41 (2012)) (establishing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to review patent claims).
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delegate at least some policy-making authority to the court.M Even
the Supreme Court may recognize the value of the Federal Circuit's
input, given the lower court's greater experience with patent law and
litigation."
A second possibility is that Congress and the Supreme Court
recognize the superior speed and agility with which the Federal
Circuit can alter the law.' Centralized appeals give the Federal
Circuit great flexibility in crafting new policy-if judges on the court
want to change the law, they will quickly be presented with an
opportunity to do so. Conversely, Congress's infinite procedural
layers and complicated interest-group dynamics make it difficult, if
not impossible, to generate enough congressional support for major
changes to various areas of patent law.87 The Supreme Court's limited
docket means that it can only monitor small segments of the patent
system at any given time. Thus, Congress and the Supreme Court may
recognize the Federal Circuit as the best option for effectively
crafting broad reforms to the patent laws.
Another possible answer is that Congress and the Supreme
Court do not delegate; rather, the Federal Circuit inserts itself into
discussions of policy without being invited. Indeed, scholars
interested in specialized courts have noted that one drawback of
specialized adjudication is a tendency towards policy making.
Whatever the current members of Congress and the Supreme Court
may think about the Federal Circuit, the decision to create the court
in the first place indicates that Congress intended to grant at least
some policy-making role to the Federal Circuit."

84. See Rai, supra note 4, at 1238 ("Congress has instead delegated responsibility for
interpreting the [patent] statute to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) and the
courts-with a historical emphasis on the court.").
85. See Golden, supra note 6, at 674-86 (arguing that the Supreme Court is less
equipped institutionally to craft efficient patent rules).
86. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 95 (arguing that courts are superior to Congress in crafting
industry-specific patent rules).
87. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Courts and the Patent System, REGULATION,
Summer 2009, at 18, 23 ("In democratically elected legislatures, an enormous commitment
of political capital is typically required to draft, promulgate, and reach consensus on new
intellectual property legislation[.]").
88. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE
FED.

Cr.

APP.

SYSTEM,

STRUCTURE

AND

INTERNAL

PROCEDURES:

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195, 234-35 (1975) (noting that judges in
specialized courts might "impose their own views of policy").
89. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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II. THE EMERGENCE OF PATENT DIALOGUE: THE SUPREME
COURT, CONGRESS, AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Although the unique dialogue between the Federal Circuit,
Congress, and the Supreme Court is often the impetus for legal
change in patent law, at other times the Federal Circuit enacts legal
change without prompting. For instance, in 2010, the court settled an
open debate in patent law: whether written description and
enablement were distinct requirements for patentability.' In an en
banc opinion in Ariad Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,91 the

court concluded that written description and enablement were
distinct statutory requirements, both of which must be met in order to
meet the statutory test for patentability.' Ariad resolved an issue that
had festered in the court for years; neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court had attempted to resolve.
In contrast to the Ariad decision, in a series of recent examples,
the Federal Circuit has engaged in a thorough restructuring of critical
doctrinal areas only after prompting by either Congress or the
Supreme Court. This Part traces recent examples of how this dialogue
occurs.
A.

The Legislative Branch
Despite the academic focus on institutional design in patent

law,93 little attention has been paid to the relationship between
Congress and the Federal Circuit.94 This lacuna in the scholarship is

90. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
91. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
92. Id. at 1344-45.
93. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
94. There are some treatments of the topic. In previous work, I have discussed in
detail the benefits of the interaction between Congress and the court. See Anderson, supra
note 16 (manuscript at 38-40). Paul Gugliuzza has examined instances in which the
Federal Circuit preempted congressional proposals. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal
Circuitas a FederalCourt,54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1827-28 (2013) ("[T]he Federal
Circuit has obstructed other institutions [including Congress] from shaping patent law.").
Dan Burk has discussed the normative implications of such preemptive law making. Burk,
supra note 16, at 22 (arguing for congressional intervention only for structural and
administrative changes to the patent system). Craig Nard has argued that Congress's
historical role of limited procedural reform should be the full extent of Congress's
engagement with patent law. See Nard, supra note 78, at 108 (arguing for a congressional
role limited to procedural reform and correction legislation). John Thomas has argued for
a prominent congressional role in patent policy. John R. Thomas, Patent Governance in
the United States: Lessons from Bilski v. Kappos, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE
PATENT LAW 193, 218 (Emanuela Arezzo & Gustavo Ghidini eds., 2011) ("For these
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largely the result of Congress's general disinterest in patent law since
it created the Federal Circuit in 1982.91 Until recently, Congress had
largely turned over the task of interpreting the patent statute to the
courts, and to a lesser degree, to the PTO. 9 6
Congress's inattention to patent law abruptly ended when it
passed the AIA in 2011.' The final bill represented the most
comprehensive legislative reform of U.S. patent law in nearly sixty
years. The enacted law made two major changes to the patent
system. First, it changed the U.S. system from a "first-to-invent"
system to a "first-to-file" system-similar, but not identical, to the
system used in nearly every other country.99 Second, the law created a
host of post-grant review procedures at the PTO."c
While the AIA significantly updated patent law, the process of
passing the bill was perhaps most notable for what it did not do. The
AIA began as an effort to remedy problems within the patent system
first identified by reports from the Federal Trade Commission and
the National Academy of Science.' 01 Those reports identified a variety
of potential improvements to the patent system, including better
funding for the PTO, an improved nonobviousness standard, and
tightening the requirements for finding willful infringement.102
As the legislative patent reform process gained momentum in
2005, however, Congress began to grapple with a host of other issues
that impact the patent system. At various times, Congress proposed
fundamental changes to (1) claim construction appeals, (2) damages
standards for patent cases, (3) inequitable conduct, and (4) the patent

reasons, congressional ability to address recognized concerns with the U.S. patent system
cannot wisely be discounted or dismissed.").
95. See Rai, supra note 4, at 1238.
96. See id.
97. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §H 102, 282 (2012)).
98. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part
I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B. J. 435, 435 (2011).
99. See id. at 438.
100. See id.
101. See generally A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill,

Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (discussing, in part, the FTC's
recommendations for improving the U.S. patent system and comparing with those of other
committees); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF

COMPETITION

AND

PATENT

LAW

AND

POLICY

(2003),

available

at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (noting problematic areas within patent
law and making recommendations for their improvement).
102. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 101, at 10-16 (noting problematic areas within
patent law and making recommendations for their improvement).
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venue statute. 03 As I have detailed in previous work, those issues
were ultimately omitted from the final bill. This omission is largely
due to a number of actions by the Federal Circuit that eliminated the
need for additional congressional reform.'" Essentially, the Federal
Circuit preempted congressional reforms by altering the law
surrounding the troubled areas that Congress was seeking to reform.
In fact, many of the changes enacted by the Federal Circuit closely
resembled proposed congressional reform. In light of the court's
actions, Congress removed those issues from the final version of the
AIA. 05
The Federal Circuit's response to congressional proposals (and
Congress's resulting action of dropping those proposals following
changes to the Federal Circuit's case law) represents a dialogic
relationship that exists between the two institutions. During the AIA,
that dialogue began with Congress identifying broad areas in need of
legal change and by proposing legislative reform in those areas. Then,
the Federal Circuit responded to Congress (1) by changing the law to
address the legislature's concern or (2) by suggesting that there is no
need for change. This Section will trace the dialogic interaction
surrounding two issues: damages and claim construction.
1. Dialogue During the Passage of the America Invents Act:
Damages
During the legislative battles on patent reform, Congress put
forward a number of different statutory reforms aimed at improving
the calculation of patent infringement damage awards. Those
proposals included limiting the availability of treble damages for
willful infringement,o 6 limiting damage awards to the economic value
attributable to the patent's improvement over the prior art, 07 and
codifying the district court's role as a "gatekeeper" for patent damage
decisions before a jury. 0 '

103. Anderson, supra note 16 (manuscript at Part II).
104. Id. (manuscript at 20-38) (detailing actions by the Federal Circuit that eliminated
the need for Congressional reform).
105. Id. (manuscript at 38); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 94, at 1827 ("[C]hanges in
Federal Circuit law have often tracked pending legislative proposals, resulting in an
indirect dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches.").
106. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6(2)(b)(1) (2005) (noting a court "may increase the
damages up to three times the amount of damages ... assessed").
107. See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007).
108. See S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); see also S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 31 (2009) (noting
the committee's considerations on patent reform); Matal, supra note 98, at 442.

1072

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

It is clear that some members of Congress viewed these
proposals as invitations for the Federal Circuit to engage in patent
reform. For example, while a patent reform bill was pending in the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Arlen Specter sent a letter to
the Committee asking that debate on the bill be delayed. 0 9 Citing the
"symbiotic relationship between the judicial and legislative branches
with regard to changes to the patent system," Specter suggested that
the upcoming argument in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway,

Inc."o at the Federal Circuit might "facilitate a compromise or clarify
the applicability of damages theories in various contexts.""' Specter
asked his colleagues to defer debate on the patent bills so that the
Federal Circuit could respond to Congress's concerns regarding
damages. 112
Over the next three years, the Federal Circuit significantly
updated and clarified its damages jurisprudence. This updating,
following a long period of dormancy regarding damages law, is likely
the direct result of Congress's sincere interest in updating the
standards for patent damages.
The Federal Circuit began updating damages law in an en banc
decision in In re Seagate Technology."3 In Seagate, the court
overruled its own precedent that accused infringers owed an
"affirmative duty of due care" in order to avoid a finding of willful
infringement." 4 Following Seagate, the court, in a series of rulings,
reversed a number of high-value damage awards as unsupported by
the evidence. Those cases saw the court require more precise
economic data in support of damages awards than it had previously
required."' Lastly, the court rejected the use of the "25 percent rule"
in damages calculations, a rule that the court admitted it had
"passively tolerated" for years." 6 All of these changes had been
109. See Letter from Senator Arlen Specter, to Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments//patentdamages//03-03-09-Specter-to-PJLPatents.pdf.
110. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
111. Letter from Senator Arlen Specter, supra note 109.
112. Id.
113. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
114. Id. at 1371.
115. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292,1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(overturning $388 million damage award); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860,
871, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (remanding the case to calculate a reasonable royalty in
accordance with Lucent); Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1335-36 (overturning a $350 million damage
award).
116. Uniloc USA, 632 F.3d at 1314.
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included in patent reform proposals."' As a result of this flurry of
damages jurisprudence at the Federal Circuit, Congress subsequently
removed all mention of damage reform from the final patent reform
bill.118
The Federal Circuit did more than merely adjust its case law in
response to Congress's signal that patent damage law was in need of
repair. Members of the court-most prominently Chief Judge
Michel-directly lobbied Congress to drop patent damage reform
from its agenda."' While patent reform bills were pending before
congressional committee in 2007, Chief Judge Michel sent a letter to
Senators Leahy and Hatch opposing enactment of the bills.120 Judge
Michel argued that the provisions on damage apportionment were
unnecessary and incapable of being implemented by the courts. 21
From the Chief Judge's perspective, district courts would be unable to
distinguish the economic value of the inventive elements of a patent
from the non-inventive elements.122
Judge Michel then sent a second letter to Shanna Winters, Chief
Counsel to the House Subcommittee on the Courts, Internet, and
Intellectual Property.123 In this letter, he argued that the existing
damages law was "highly stable and well understood by litigators as
well as judges."124 He suggested that Congress ought to "do nothing"
concerning damages.125 Judge Michel's lobbying efforts, in concert
117. S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (codifying In re Seagate). There is no official public
version of the 2010 managers' amendment. However, it was widely available and available
on various patent weblogs. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy,
Sessions, Hatch, Schumer, Kyl, Kaufman Unveil Details of Patent Reform Agreement
(Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/pressreleases/release
/?id=8b0f5bb3-121b-484a-bOb7-092d7bdeelac. See generally Anderson, supra note 16
(manuscript at 20-38) (detailing the inclusion of damages changes in earlier patent reform
proposals).
118. America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Anderson, supra
note 16 (manuscript at 37-38) (noting that damages was one of the issues that Congress
removed following the Federal Circuit's changes in damages jurisprudence).
119. Letter from Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, to Senator Orrin Hatch and Senator
Patrick Leahy 1-2 (May 3, 2007), available at http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/attachments
/patentdamages/05-03-07Michelletter.pdf.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2.
122. See id. (arguing that district courts lack the "experience and expertise" to make
"such extensive, complex economic valuations" of either patented or nonpatented features
of accused products).
123. Letter from Chief Judge Paul Michel, to Shanna Winters, Chief Counsel to the
House Subcomm. on the Courts, Internet, and Intellectual Property (June 7, 2007),
availableat http://www.patenthawk.comlblog-docs/Michelletter_670707.pdf.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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with the Federal Circuit's recent changes to its own damages
jurisprudence, convinced Congress to entirely remove damages
reform from the final version of the AIA.126
2. Dialogue During the Passage of the America Invents Act:
Claim Construction
The Federal Circuit and Congress also engaged in discussion
about other issues as well. For example, during the passage of the
AIA, Congress and the Federal Circuit debated the most efficient
means of appellate review of patent claim construction.127 Beginning
in 2006, Congress proposed statutory language that would have
permitted interlocutory review of claim construction appeals, later
amending the proposed statute to require interlocutory review. 128 At
the time these reforms were first proposed, reversal rates of claim
construction appeals were notoriously high: up to forty percent in
some years. 129 A reversal on claim construction often results in a new
trial and is therefore quite costly to the parties involved. 3 0 Congress
therefore proposed interlocutory review of claim construction in
order to reduce the cost of patent litigation.131
Senator Orrin Hatch-the sponsor of the first bill to allow
interlocutory review of claim construction-reached out to the
Federal Circuit for input on the proposal.132 Senator Hatch stated that
the interlocutory review provision was intended to "generate

126. America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Anderson, supra
note 16 (manuscript at 37-38) (noting that damages was one of the issues that Congress
removed following the Federal Circuit's changes in damages jurisprudence).
127. Claim construction in patent law refers to the judicial process of interpreting the
meaning and scope of patent claim language. ROBERT L. HARMON, CYNTHIA A. HOMAN
& CHARLES M. MCMAHON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 364 (11th ed. 2013).
128. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8 (2006).
129. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 11-17 (2001) (calculating a twenty-seven percent reversal rate of
District Court claim construction decisions from 1995-2000). For a modern update of
Judge Moore's results, to account for data after 2000, see J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S.
Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent
Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 41 (2014) (finding that the reversal rate
dropped to 20.4% in 2011).
130. Moore, supranote 129, at 2-3.
131. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8 (2006); see also S. REP.
No. 110-259, at 28 (2007) ("The Committee intends to transfer the discretion from the
Federal Circuit to the district court judge as to whether-and when-a claim construction
order should be decided on appeal.").
132. Senator Orrin Hatch, Statement before the United States Senate, at 4 (Aug. 3,
2006), available at http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/publications/Patent-Reform-Archive
/hatch-statement.pdf.
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discussion" of the optimal solution for the high rate of claim
construction appeals.133 The bill did just that. Chief Judge Michel
wrote to Congress, expressing his displeasure with the proposed
change to interlocutory appeals, just as he had done regarding
proposed changes to damages law. 13 4
Furthermore, the Chief Judge urged the patent bar to take up the
court's fight to remove interlocutory review from the AIA. In June of
2009, Chief Judge Michel suggested in a speech to the Federal Circuit
Bar Association Bench-Bar Conference that interlocutory review was
"the greatest threat to speedy dispositions" at the Federal Circuit.135
He also predicted that permissive interlocutory review would double
the amount of cases at the Federal Circuit and double the average
disposition time for patent appeals.' He concluded his remarks by
expressing hope that the Federal Circuit Bar Association "and the
entire patent bar will advise and caution Congress on this issue."13
Congress evidently came around to Judge Michel's position: changes
to interlocutory appeals procedures were removed from future
versions of patent reform legislation."'s
3. Dialogue During the Passage of the America Invents Act:
Summary
The process of congressional patent reform that culminated with
the AIA revealed a new channel of dialogue between Congress and
the Federal Circuit. The back and forth between the court and
Congress was likely responsible for reforming patent law in ways that
would have been impossible for Congress acting alone, due to the
interest-group dynamics of patent stakeholders. 3 9 Congress catalyzed
the Federal Circuit to enact reform measures by identifying broad
areas in need of reform. Indeed, many legislative proposals during the
AIA process were explicitly designed to initiate a dialogue between
Congress and the Federal Circuit.14 By identifying broad areas in
133. Id.
134. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
135. Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, 2009 State of the Court Speech, White Sulphur
Springs, WV, at 2 (June 19, 2009), availableat http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories
/announcements/2009/socO9.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011); see Anderson,
supra note 16 (manuscript at 38) (noting the removal of interlocutory appeals procedures).
139. Burk, supra note 16, at 20, 22.
140. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents
Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B. J. 435 (2012) (discussing throughout the relationship
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need of reform, Congress permitted the Federal Circuit to make a
first attempt at patent reform. Once the court acted, Congress then
chose whether or not to override the judicial action via legislation.
Dialogue between the Federal Circuit and Congress has recently
developed in the area of patent litigation reform. This dialogue shares
many of the characteristics of the dialogic dynamic that developed
during the debates about the AIA. As described more fully in Part
IV, Congress has proposed numerous legislative fixes to the "patent
troll" problem. 4 ' Judge Michel's successor as Chief Judge of the
Federal Circuit, Judge Rader has responded by suggesting that
legislative changes are unnecessary. The renewed dialogue between
the court and Congress suggests that judicial-legislative interaction
may become a fixture of future patent policy debates.
B. JudicialBranch
The Supreme Court's relationship with the Federal Circuit has
been a subject of considerable interest for scholars.'42 The Supreme
Court occasionally reviews decisions of the Federal Circuit, and as
with all other circuit courts, the Supreme Court has the final judicial
say on "what the law is."' 43 John Golden has argued that the Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit should engage each other more explicitly.
Because the Federal Circuit is the only circuit that reviews patent
cases, Golden argues that the Supreme Court should view its role as a
"percolator" of patent law doctrines rather than as a "final law
sayer."'" Golden's work explicitly encourages a dialogic
relationship-he urges the Supreme Court to "spur, rather than
foreclose, subsequent legal development" from the Federal Circuit.'45
Golden's percolation rationale for Supreme Court intervention
in patent law has much to recommend it. However, the potential for
percolative dialogue between the two courts extends beyond the
between the AIA as a form of congressional response to Federal Circuit precedent). An
example of the Federal Circuit reacting to legislative proposals can be seen in Ken Brooks
v. Dunlap Manufacturing, 702 F.3d 624, 629-30 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See Dennis Crouch,
Federal Circuit Rejects Due Process Challenge to AIA on False Marketing Retroactivity,
PATENTLY-O BLOG (Dec. 13, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/federal-circuit(describing how
rejects-due-process-challenge-to-aia-on-false-marking-retroactivity.html
the Federal Circuit responded to congressional record of the AIA in Ken Brooks).
141. See infra Part IV.C.
142. See generally supra note 9 (describing the relationship of the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit).
143. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
144. Golden, supra note 6, at 662.
145. Id.
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Supreme Court reversing ossified Federal Circuit precedents, as
Golden urges.146 The Federal Circuit-Supreme Court dialogue can
and does extend to precursors of Supreme Court review, such as
grants of certiorari and calls for the views of the Solicitor General.
The unique relationship between the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court has led to a new, somewhat contentious form of
dialogue between the two courts.
Because the Federal Circuit hears all appeals arising under the
patent laws, the court is highly interested in the review of patent cases
at the Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit's interest in Supreme
Court review may exceed the other circuit courts' interest in such
review. For example, when certiorari is granted for a case from a U.S.
court of appeals, there is undoubtedly interest in the outcome of the
case from the judges on the court being reviewed: no judge or court
likes to be reversed and judges are likely to be particularly interested
in the outcome of cases that they have decided. But because the
numbered circuits have a diverse, generalized docket, a Supreme
Court reversal of any individual doctrine is unlikely to have a major
impact on the day-to-day decision making of that court as a whole.
Indeed, the reviewed issue may seldom arise in the future.
Conversely, the judges on the Federal Circuit are keenly aware
of the patent cases that are heard by the Supreme Court. This keen
interest results not only because Federal Circuit judges, like other
judges, are personally invested in the Supreme Court's review of their
decisions, but also because doctrinal changes at the Supreme Court
interrupt the everyday work of deciding patent cases at the Federal
Circuit. Because nearly half of the Federal Circuit's cases are patent
cases, 14 7 reversals by the Supreme Court greatly impact the daily
process of judging on the Federal Circuit.
1. Judicial Dialogue: Grants and Denials of Certiorari
The Federal Circuit is sufficiently interested in Supreme Court
review of its cases that, at times, the court has attempted to influence
the Supreme Court's opinion in patent cases which have been granted
certiorari. For example, before oral argument at the Supreme Court,
the Federal Circuit has attempted to update or clarify its caselaw in
an attempt to preempt reversals at the high Court. The court's recent
attempt to preempt Supreme Court changes to nonobviousness law
146. Id. (arguing that the Supreme Court should limit its review of Federal Circuit
patent cases to those in which the Federal Circuit precedent has "frozen legal doctrine").
147. See supra note 24.
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provides a good example of this practice. Prior to 2005, the Federal
Circuit had created a rather formalistic test for determining whether
an invention was nonobvious: the court required evidence that the
prior art taught, suggested, or provided a motivation for combining
two previously known references.'" The test was widely criticized as
overly rigid.'4 9 The strict test forced the PTO to grant thousands of
patents that would likely have been obvious to a person of ordinary
skill.'s In 2005, the Supreme Court decided to review that
controversial standard, granting certiorari in KSR InternationalCo. v.
Teleflex Inc.'"' KSR was a non-precedential Federal Circuit decision
holding that a patent on a computerized automobile pedal was
nonobvious and therefore patentable because there was no "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" to combine prior art references of vehicle
control pedals and electronic throttle controls.15 2
After the grant of certiorari, but before oral arguments at the
Supreme Court,5 the Federal Circuit issued two key opinions on
nonobviousness. Both cases characterized the teaching-suggestionmotivation test as a flexible one.'54 In Dystar Textilfarben GMBH &
Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.,' the court attempted to
soften the rigidity of its test by emphasizing that the test "requires

148. See, e.g., Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340,1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("When an obviousness determination is based on multiple prior art references, there
must be a showing of some 'teaching, suggestion, or reason' to combine the references."
(quoting Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1997))).
149. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? EvaluatingInventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 890 (2004) ("The Federal Circuit
has deployed judicial review in ways that make it harder to establish nonobviousness ...
[which] has permitted the issuance of patents on routine advances within easy reach of
technological practitioners of ordinary skill.").
150. Id. at 890-91; see also Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A RealisticApproach
to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 992-99 (2008) (describing
the state of obviousness jurisprudence before KSR).
151. 126 S. Ct. 2965-66 (2006) (mem.).
152. See generally Teleflex, Inc., v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(applying the existing obviousness standard to an adjustable pedal assembly).
153. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
154. Dystar Textilfarben GMBH & Co Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d
1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only
permits, but requires, consideration of common knowledge and common sense."
(emphasis in original)); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence because a motivation may be
found implicitly in the prior art. We do not have a rigid test that requires an actual
teaching to combine . . . .").
155. 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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consideration of common knowledge and common sense."' 56 In Alza
Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc.,1 the court suggested (for the first time)
that the motivation to combine could be found "implicitly in the prior
art.""' Both opinions read as pleas to the Supreme Court to leave the
court's jurisprudence untouched.'59 The Justices were quite aware of
the Federal Circuit's attempts to influence the Supreme Court's KSR
decision. As Justice Scalia noted during oral arguments, "in the last
year or so, after we granted cert in this case, after these decades of
thinking about [nonobviousness], [the Federal Circuit] suddenly
decides to polish it up.""s
Grants of certiorari have spurred the Federal Circuit to action in
other doctrinal areas as well. In Laboratory Corp. of America
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc.,' for example, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review whether a patent on a method of
diagnosing a vitamin deficiency was directed to patent-eligible subject
matter.162 After reversing the grant of certiorari as "improvidently
granted," 6 3 Justice Breyer penned a dissent to the denial of certiorari
in which he was joined by two other Justices. Breyer felt that the
Court should have heard the case and found the patent covered
ineligible subject matter. 16 In support of his position, he referenced
the dialogue that occurs between the Court and the Federal Circuit:
[A] decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the
important ongoing debate, among both specialists and
generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently
administered and enforced, adequately reflects the "careful
balance" that "the federal patent laws ... embod[y]."16 5
The Federal Circuit took the Court at its word regarding the
value of policy input from specialist courts. After LabCorp, the

156. Id. at 1367.
157. 464 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
158. Id. at 1291.
159. Id.
160. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350);
see also id. (transcribing Justice Breyer's comment that the Federal Circuit "so quickly
modified itself" after certiorari was granted, despite having decades in which it could have
elaborated on the doctrine).
161. 546 U.S. 999 (2005) (order granting certiorari).
162. Id.; see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
125 (2006).
163. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 126 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. See id.
165. Id. at 138 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
146 (1989)).
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Federal Circuit began experimenting with its subject matter eligibility
jurisprudence,'6 culminating in an en banc decision in In re Bilskil67
that fundamentally altered the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter.'" The Supreme Court responded to this new suggestion from
the Federal Circuit by affirming the court's holding in Bilski that the
patent was directed to non-eligible subject matter, while rejecting the
Federal Circuit's test for subject matter eligibility. 169 Dialogue
between the two courts centering on patent-eligible subject matter
has continued since Bilski. Since that decision in 2010, the Supreme
Court has issued two more decisions that reconfigured the subjectmatter inquiry'70 and will hear a third case on the topic in 2014.7
2. Judicial Dialogue: Call for the View of the Solicitor General
The Supreme Court possesses another means of catalyzing
doctrinal updates from the Federal Circuit. Before deciding to grant
certiorari in a particular patent case, the Supreme Court regularly
requests the U.S. Solicitor General to submit an amicus brief
expressing the views of the United States.172 This practice, known as
Call for the Views of the Solicitor General ("CVSG"), is often used
by the Supreme Court as a vehicle for deciding whether or not to
grant certiorari. Indeed, the Solicitor General has a solid track record
of identifying which patent issues the Supreme Court will hear.'73 The
Federal Circuit, like other observers of the patent system, certainly
recognizes that a CVSG order from the Court signals an issue that is
potentially ripe for doctrinal review. Thus, simply by soliciting the
views of the Solicitor General (regardless of what those views are),

166. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a "transitory,
propagating signal ... cannot be patentable subject matter"); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d
1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that "mental processes-or processes of human
thinking-standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application").
167. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
168. Id. at 959 (holding that the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test "is
insufficient to determine whether a claim is patent-eligible"); cf id. at 965 n.27 (indicating
that the claim at issue in Lab. Corp. was similar to other claims that covered unpatentable
subject matter).
169. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
170. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120
(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012).
171. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (No. 13-298).
172. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 525 (explaining that these requests have been an
accepted part of Supreme Court practice for about a half century).
173. See id. at 535-36 (stating that the petitions filed by the Solicitor General typically
enjoy a high likelihood of being granted by the Supreme Court).
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the Supreme Court sends a signal to the Federal Circuit that a
potential area may be in need of doctrinal reform.
As an example, consider the recent case of Retractable
Technologies v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.17 4-a

dispute over the

construction of patent claims. Retractable Technologies submitted a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.17 s Upon
receiving the petition, the Court invited the U.S. Solicitor General to
weigh in on its merits.176 In his brief for the United States as amicus
curiae-which opposed the writ of certioraril 7 7-the Solicitor General
articulated the two questions presented in the Retractable
Technologies case as follows:

1. Whether a court, in construing a disputed term in a patent
claim, may draw inferences from the patentee's use of the same
term elsewhere in the patent's specification.
2. Whether, in reviewing a district court's interpretation of a
patent claim, the court of appeals should give deference to the
district court's resolution of subsidiary factual questions.178
The second question in particular-the proper standard of
review for claim construction appeals-raised issues that have been
disputed both inside and outside the Federal Circuit for years."'
Notwithstanding internal dissent over the issue and a questionable
precedential pedigree, the Federal Circuit had not reviewed the
appropriateness of its de novo review standard since its en banc
decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp. in 2005."8o

In his amicus brief to the Court, the Solicitor General concluded
that Retractable Technologies was not a proper vehicle with which to
review the standard of review for claim construction cases.s' The
Supreme Court, as it often does, sided with the Solicitor General and

174. 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 833 (2013).
175. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 133 S. Ct. 833 (2013) (No. 11-1154), 2013 WL 57105.
176. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at *1, Retractable Techs., 133 S.
Ct. 833 (No. 11-1154), 2012 WL 5940288.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 129, at 6 (arguing that while the Federal
Circuit continues to adhere to de novo standard of review for claim construction rulings,
data indicate a newfound era of "informal deference" on the court).
180. See id. at 30-32 (discussing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
181. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supranote 176, at *17.
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declined to hear the case. 18 2 However, although the Solicitor General
advised against granting certiorari, he did suggest that the standard of
appellate review for claim construction (de novo) was an issue that
was ripe for review by the Court."' Indeed, the Solicitor General
stated that the de novo review standard "is of substantial and ongoing
importance in patent law.""
Less than five months after the Solicitor General's amicus brief
in the Retractable Technologies case, the Federal Circuit granted en
banc review of the precise issue that the Solicitor General had
identified as being of substantial importance-the standard of review
for claim construction appeals. The Federal Circuit heard the case
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Electronics North America
Corp."8 in September 2013,86 and affirmed the appropriateness of de

novo review in a 6-4 decision five months later.' Before an appeal of
Lighting Ballast could reach the Supreme Court, the Court granted
certiorari in another case challenging the de novo standard for claim
construction appeals.' 8
It seems no coincidence that the Solicitor General's comments
closely preceded action from the Federal Circuit. Using CVSG to
foster dialogue between the courts allows the Supreme Court to invite
the executive branch to weigh in on troublesome issues of patent law
and policy. While this form of executive branch participation in
patent dialogue is limited to a particular litigation topic and at the
behest of the judicial branch, it represents a unique opportunity for
the executive branch to influence the doctrine of the Federal
Circuit.189

182. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 175, at *1 (denying Retractable
Technologies's petition for certiorari on Jan. 7, 2013). For more on the Solicitor General's
track record in patent cases, see Duffy, supra note 4, at 549-50.
183. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 176, at *7.
184. See id.
185. 500 F. App'x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
186. Id. For commentary on the case, see Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the
En Banc Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim Construction Issue, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 43, 44 (2013), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu
/files/uploads/Dialogue/ReillyOnline Final.pdf
187. Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. (No. 2012-1014),
2014WL667499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc).
188. Teva Farms USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (No. 13-845), 2014WL199529 (U.S. Mar. 31,
2014) (certiorari granted).
189. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 537.
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3. Judicial Dialogue: Summary
Even though the Federal Circuit is, by some measures, the most
reversed circuit court in the United States,1" the court still enjoys a
dialogic relationship with the Supreme Court. The most recognizable
form of judicial dialogue in patent law occurs through case law, with
the Supreme Court regularly reversing the Federal Circuit, but issuing
broad, policy-like opinions that require the Federal Circuit to
doctrinally innovate."' The Supreme Court has means beyond
reversals by which to signal its reform agenda to the Federal Circuit,
however. The Federal Circuit has shown itself to be quick to react to
both grants of certiorari and calls for the views of the Solicitor
General.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO REFORM
SIGNALS

Having examined dialogic relationships between the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the Federal Circuit, this Part will provide a
taxonomy of the various ways in which the Federal Circuit responds
to policy reform signals. The court responds in three primary ways: by
reviewing its case law, by instructing the institutions over which it has
primacy, and through direct advocacy or lobbying.
A.

JudicialReview
The most familiar tool in the Federal Circuit's dialogic toolkit is
the court's power of judicial review. The court uses its power of
judicial review to respond to signals from Congress or the Supreme
Court in an attempt to ameliorate the problematic doctrinal area
identified by Congress or the Supreme Court. Because of the Federal
Circuit's extensive patent docket, it can usually respond to such
signals in the process of adjudicating its non-discretionary docketthose appeals that appear on the court's monthly calendar. At times,
however, the court must use its discretionary powers in order to
respond to particular issues in a timely manner. Those issues must be

190. See John Summers & Michael Newman, The "Full" Method of Measuring the
Court's Review of Decisions by the Courts of Appeals: October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 23, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/the-full-method-ofmeasuring-the-courts-review-of-decisions-by-the-courts-of-appeals-october-term2011/#sthash.QFlj6BcD.dpuf.
191. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (highlighting the dialogue between the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit over 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable subject matter through a
series of Supreme Court reversals).
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handled through the discretionary review process because they
infrequently or never arise in the court's non-discretionary docket.
This Part will analyze the court's use of both non-discretionary and
discretionary judicial review in turn.
1. Non-Discretionary Review
Because of the centralized nature of appellate patent law, the
Federal Circuit's patent docket permits it to review most patent law
doctrines on a regular basis. The court hears over 600 patent cases
annually, thus it has numerous opportunities each year to revisit its
case law for any given patent doctrine. 92 For instance, the court hears
around 100 appeals of district court claim construction rulings every
year.'" If Congress or the Supreme Court signals that claim
construction is an area in need of updating, the court will have the
opportunity to update the law within a relatively short period of time.
An important example of the court using its docket to respond to
policy signals occurred between 2007 and 2009, while Congress was
contemplating various reforms to the patent damage statute. In 2009,
at the height of congressional debate about the shape of patent
damage reform, a three-judge panel heard Lucent Technologies, Inc.
v. Gateway, Inc.194 The district court found that Microsoft's Office
software, in particular the "date-picker" function in Office, infringed
Lucent's patents."' A jury awarded Lucent $350 million in damages,
apparently based on an eight percent royalty of all sales of Office,
even though the patent covered only a minor aspect of the software's
functionality.196 On appeal, the patent bar anticipated a potentially
landmark damages decision, especially regarding the controversial
"entire market value" ("EMV") rule. Under the EMV rule, damages
are calculated as a percentage of the value of the entire product.'*
The case attracted interest beyond the patent bar, as well. Senator
Arlen Specter felt that the case was of such potential importance that
he sent a letter to his colleagues urging delay on debate over the
damage reform provision until after oral argument in the case.198

192. See supra note 25.
193. See Anderson & Menell, supra note 129, at 35.
194. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
195. Id. at 1320.
196. Id. at 1336.
197. For more on EMV, see generally Mark A. Lemley, DistinguishingLost Profits
from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 655 (2009) (suggesting that the EMV
rule should have little role in reasonable royalty law).
198. See supra note 109.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the damage award and
remanded to the district court for a new trial on damages. 99 The
Federal Circuit's opinion in Lucent clarified and addressed both
damages issues percolating in Congress at the time: the method of
calculating royalties and the appropriateness of using the EMV
rule. 21 Although the court did not eliminate the use of the EMV rule
for reasonable royalties, it did require greater evidence of economic
damages than the court had required in the past.201
The court continued to address damages jurisprudence
throughout 2009, clarifying the law in a way that had not occurred in
the previous twenty-seven years of the court's existence.2" The
court's shift towards a more aggressive supervisory role in damages
jurisprudence suggests a court newly energized in an area of law that
had been largely untended prior to Congress's reform signals. 203 The
emergent case law appears to have placated Congress, as Congress
chose to remove damages from the final version of the AIA, despite
renewed criticism of the court's new line of cases.2 04
The court's interest in addressing issues identified by the
Supreme Court or Congress is also evident in its outreach to the
patent bar. Members of the court have asked the bar to appeal certain
types of cases in order to reform the law. Chief Judge Michel urged
litigants to make better use of the en banc process in order to allow
his court, rather than the Supreme Court, to reform the law.205 This
form of litigant contact reveals a court interested in convincing
Congress that courts (both district and appellate) are capable of
making the necessary changes to the law of patent damages to satisfy
the policy goals of the patent system.206

199. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1340.
200. Id. at 1324.
201. See generally Lemley, supra note 197 (arguing for a severely limited role for
EMV).
202. See Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:A Case Study in Specialized Courts, supra note
9, at 12 (noting that the Federal Circuit has "tended to hide behind the skirts of the district
courts" on damages).
203. See supra notes 113-16.
204. See Anderson, supra note 16 (manuscript at 37). See generally Dmitry Karshtedt,
Formalism and Pragmatism in the Analysis of Damages for Indirect PatentInfringement, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (critiquing the new damage cases).
205. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
206. See infra Part III.C.
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2. Discretionary Review
The Federal Circuit's docket typically provides ample
opportunity for the court to change the law in a manner consistent
with the signals that the court receives from other institutions. At
times, however, the court must exercise its power of discretionary
review in order to reach certain topic areas. For example, in 2008, the
court embarked on a novel method of improving the patent venue
rules.
From its inception in 1982 until 2008, the Federal Circuit had
never granted a writ of mandamus to overturn a transfer of venue
decision.207 That changed in December 2008, when the court granted
mandamus review in In re TS Tech USA Corp.208 Not coincidentally,
Congress was, at that time, considering altering the patent venue
statute (an alteration that Chief Judge Michel publicly opposed).2 09 in
TS Tech, the Federal Circuit issued an order granting transfer of
venue and established a new standard for transfer motions of patent
cases. 210 The Federal Circuit held that the district court had given
"inordinate weight" to plaintiffs' venue choice, ignored the
inconvenience to non-parties, and improperly analyzed the access to
sources of proof.211
In the years following TS Tech, the Federal Circuit took a much
more active role in policing denials of motions to transfer: between
2008 and 2012, the court granted writs to overturn denials of motions
to transfer in eleven cases.212 Over this time, the court's newfound
attention to policing motions to transfer venue convinced Congress
that the venue reforms contemplated by Congress were
unnecessary. 213 As in other areas, the Federal Circuit's response to
207. See Paul Gugliuzza, The New FederalCircuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 346
(2012).
208. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
209. Hon. Paul R. Michel, Address at the Winter Meeting of the Association of
Corporate Patent Counsel 12 (Jan. 28, 2008) (transcript available at URL),
http://www.patentdocs.typepad.com/patent-docs/files/address-by-chief-judge-michel.pdf
(refusing to discuss venue because there is too much he has to say on the topic).
210. TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1323.
211. Id. at 1320.
212. Ten of those eleven cases have come from the Eastern District of Texas. See
Gugliuzza, supra note 207, at 346; Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue
Transfer in Patent Cases: Marshall's Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 61, 69 (2010).
213. Congress did alter the joinder rules of patent cases in the AIA. The new joinder
provisions are seen by many as a substitute for the removed venue provisions of previous
versions of the AIA. See David 0. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 NYU L. REV. 652, 654
(2013) ("In enacting this new statutory section, Congress and the President took a
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congressional signals resulted in removal of the venue provisions
from the AIA.214
The court has also begun to expand its use of en banc review in
order to respond to policy signals. 215 After the passage of the AIA,
the court used its en banc power to resolve an issue that meandered
in and out of legislative patent reform proposals: inequitable
conduct.216 In 2010, the court announced that it had granted en banc
review of a case concerning the doctrine of inequitable conduct, a
troubled doctrinal area that had been languishing in uncertainty for
over a decade.217 While the case, Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson and
Co.,218 was decided after the AIA was signed into law, the
announcement that the Federal Circuit was taking the issue en banc
likely led Congress to remove the issue from the legislation in the first
place.219
B.

The Court's Teaching Function

The Federal Circuit directly reviews the decisions of a host of
institutions involved in some way with patent law: the PTO, the
International Trade Commission, the U.S. District Courts, and the
Court of Claims.220 One way that the court can respond to policy
signals from Congress and the Supreme Court is by instructing these
institutions regarding procedure or doctrine. This instruction has two
policy-making impacts: first, it tees up issues for the Federal Circuit
so that the court can address congressional concerns; second, it acts as
a response in itself by demonstrating to Congress or the Supreme
Court that proper instruction-not legal change-is all that is
required to achieve the policy aims of the patent statute.
During the debate surrounding damages reform, the court
instructed district courts on the means of damage calculations and the
significant step toward correcting a perceived problem plaguing patent infringement
litigation-so-called 'patent trolls' joining numerous unrelated accused infringers in
inconvenient venues.").
214. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §H 102, 282 (2012)).
215. See Duffy, supra note 9, at 300-01 (explaining the benefits of en banc review by
the Federal Circuit); Golden, supra note 6, at 717-18 (urging the Federal Circuit to
increase en banc review).
216. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
217. See John M. Golden, Patent Law's Falstaff. Inequitable Conduct, the Federal
Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 353, 376 (2012).
218. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
219. Id. at 1294.
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
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requisite proof to support damages awards by issuing opinions
detailing the evidentiary burden associated with proving damage
awards in reasonable royalty cases. 221 As described above, the court
performed this function through the traditional means of written
opinions as well as through the more unconventional means of
directives and instructions to practitioners.222
Additionally, the court has instructed district courts on policy
and doctrine by having a Federal Circuit judge sit as a district court
judge by designation. In March 2009, the Federal Circuit's Judge
Rader presided over a patent trial (sitting by designation) in the
Northern District of New York.223 In Cornell University v. HewlettPackard Co.,224 a jury awarded $184 million in damages for HewlettPackard's infringement of Cornell's patent covering computer
processing technology. 225 Cornell's damage calculation was based on a
percentage of the total market value of Hewlett-Packard's "CPU
bricks" (over twenty-three billion dollars), even though the patented
invention was only a small component of the brick.226 Judge Rader
took issue with Cornell's application of the EMV rule.227 While
conceding that the EMV rule could apply to a situation in which the
royalty base is broader than the invention, Judge Rader stated that
the EMV rule applied "only upon proof that damages on the
unpatented components or technology is necessary to fully
compensate for infringement of the patented invention." 228 Thus,
Judge Rader emphasized the high evidentiary standard that such a
rule required. He granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law
and reduced the damage award from $184 million to $53 million.229
Although the Cornell case was not binding on district judges
around the country, as a sitting Federal Circuit Judge (and soon to be
Chief Judge 230 ), Judge Rader's decision carried significant persuasive
221. See supra Part II.A.1.
222. See supra Part I.B.1.
223. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (N.D.N.Y.
2009).
224. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
225. Id. at 282.
226. Id. at 283.
227. Id. at 284.
228. Id. at 285.
229. Id. at 293.
230. Judge Rader was sworn in as Chief Judge on May 31, 2010, after former Chief
Judge Michel announced his retirement in November 2009. See Federal Circuit Chief
Judge Paul Michel Announces That He is Leaving the Bench, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Nov.
21, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/11/federal-circuit-chief-judge-paul-michel
-announces-that-he-is-leaving-the-bench.html.
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value. Practitioners noted that the case signaled a Federal Circuit
suddenly more willing to entertain arguments about incongruous
damage awards.231 Indeed, many saw Cornell as evidence that the
Federal Circuit, and not Congress, was the proper venue to
restructure damages law. 2 A news story about the case announced
that "The Courts Beat Congress to Patent Reform (Again)." 233
A year after sitting by designation in New York, Judge Rader
presided over another patent case, this time in the Eastern District of
Texas. 23 On March 10, 2010, he authored an opinion outlining the
evidentiary standards for patent damage judgments. 235 Again
highlighting the role of the district court as gatekeeper, Judge Rader
first rejected the patent holder's request to use the EMV rule to
calculate damages, then threw out testimony of the plaintiff's
damages expert regarding a reasonable royalty because he had failed
to "show a sound economic connection between the claimed
invention and this broad proffered royalty base."236
As Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, Judge Rader has
continued to instruct district courts regarding patent case
management. Recently, as a number of congressional proposals have
been put forward that would implement fee shifting in patent cases,
231. See, e.g., Michael J. Kasdan & Joseph Casino, Federal Courts Closely Scrutinizing
and Slashing Patent Damage Awards, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 24, 35, available at
www.patentlyo.com/files/kasdan.casino.damages.pdf (concluding that Cornell and progeny
"indicate an emerging trend to more carefully scrutinize the evidentiary and economic
basis of" patent damage awards); James R. Kyper & Roberto Capriotti, District Court
Tightens Requirements for Applying Entire Market Value Rule in Cornell's Patent
Infringement Damages Case Against Hewlett-Packard, K&L GATES, IP Litigation Alert
(April 2009), at 3, available at http://www.klgates.com/files/tempFiles/38fd509b-Of07-42bda0e0-6678a83d036a/AlertIPCornell_041509.pdf ("The decision is noteworthy because it
was made by Judge Rader, who normally sits on the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. Therefore, the decision may suggest a more limited application of the EMV Rule
that may find other allies at the Federal Circuit.").
232. See, e.g., Latham & Watkins Litigation Department, ClientAlert No. 970: The Law
of Patent Damages: Who Will Have the Final Say? (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.google
.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=OCFAQFjAD&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fwww.1w.com%2FthoughtLeadership%2Flaw-of-patent-damages-lucentdamagescase&ei=vh4yUZKbJMrnOgHy9oHACQ&usg=AFQjCNHPP7JSlF 4cVPL80kgusWU2
WR43A&bvm=bv.43148975,d.dmQ&cad=rja
(arguing that the Cornell decision
"support[s] the argument that courts are fully equipped to police patent damages awards
without legislative intervention").
233. Bernard Chao, The Courts Beat Congress to Patent Reform (Again), LAW360
(Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.law360.comlarticles/114040.
234. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
235. Id. at 691.
236. Id. at 689.
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he co-wrote an op-ed in the New York Times supporting the idea of
fee shifting, but arguing that district court judges already possess the
requisite power to award fees in appropriate cases. 237 In the op-ed,
Chief Judge Rader and his co-authors identify a number of attributes
of "abusive litigation" and implore judges to use section 285 of the
Patent Act and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
monitor abusive litigation techniques and to punish the offenders
accordingly. 238 He concludes by "urg[ing]" judges to use their powers
to monitor litigation. 239 Judge Rader's strategy-instructing district
court judges regarding the scope of their powers-mirrors the Federal
Circuit's approach to congressional dialogue during the passage of the
AIA.240
C.

DirectAdvocacy
Perhaps the most controversial ways in which the Federal Circuit
responds to policy signals from the Supreme Court and Congress is
through direct advocacy and lobbying. With patent reform bills
pending in both the House and Senate, Chief Judge Michel sent
letters directly to the Senate Judiciary Committee arguing against
particular elements in the legislation.2 4' In particular, he opposed any
statutory update to damages jurisprudence and any change to the
standards of interlocutory review of claim construction appeals.242
Moreover, he gave speeches to practicing attorneys in which he
suggested that the proposed changes to damages and claim
construction would adversely impact the work of the courts.243
Further, he wrote various op-eds suggesting that Congress need not
interfere in areas of patent litigation.2 " Such direct lobbying of
Congress from a sitting judge is rare. 245 The directness with which

237. Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Op-Ed., Make Patent Trolls
Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion
/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supraPart II.A.1.
241. See supranote 119 and accompanying text.
242. See supranote 119 and accompanying text.
243. See supranotes 135-37 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, Q&A: Judge Michel on Patent Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
27, 2009, 12:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/11/27/qa-judge-michel-on-patentlaw/ (arguing that "the management of ongoing litigation [including damages is] inherently
judicial" in nature).
245. Exceptions do exist. For example, "judges have banded together to encourage
Congress to increase [judicial] salaries." Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee Be Judged
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Judge Michel addressed congressional proposals suggests a court that
views itself as uniquely situated to supervise the state of patent law.
It is difficult, of course, to discern how much of the lobbying
effort that occurred during the patent reform process reflects the
views of the Federal Circuit judges as a unit and how much of the
effort was the Chief Judge acting alone. It might be the case that
Judge Michel's interest in patent reform was personal and should not
be imputed to the court. Judge Michel is, after all, former chief
counsel for Senator Specter, one of the principal players behind the
AIA.246 Thus, he is undoubtedly well versed in, cognizant of, and
interested in the legislative process.247 Indeed, he left the court before
his term as Chief Judge ended in order to "speak freely on all aspects
of patent reform."248 Judge Michel lamented that his position on the
bench required him to limit his advocacy to "the potential impact of

Unworthy of a Pay Raise: An Examination of the Federal Judicial Salary "Crisis," 87
MARQ. L. REV. 55,55 (2003).
246. Chief Judge Michel served as Senator Specter's chief counsel from 1981 until his
appointment to the bench in 1988. Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, The View from the Bench: A
Conversation with Paul Michel '66, Retired ChiefJudge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, UVA LAWYER (Fall 2012), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/alumni
/uvalawyer/fl2/michel.htm.
247. Moreover, Michel's legislative experience is not unique among the judges of the
court. Judges Rader and Prost also come from legislative backgrounds. Judge Rader
served as legislative director of the House Ways and Means Committee before serving as
counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1980-1988. Randall R. Rader, Chief
Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges
/randall-r-rader-chief-judge.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). He has also served as counsel
for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. Id. Judge Prost served as
Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee immediately before her elevation to the
bench. Sharon Prost, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/sharon-prost-circuit-judge.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2014); see also Dreyfuss, In Search of InstitutionalIdentity: The Federal Circuit Comes of
Age, supra note 9, at 821 n.167 (discussing Judge Rader's past as a "former trial court
judge[]"). Indeed, the Federal Circuit judges (who are required to live within 50 miles of
Washington D.C., see 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2012)), often have some tie to Washington, either
through politics or legal work. Professor Dreyfuss has surmised that the legislative
background of some of the members of the court might lead the court to avoid impinging
on legislative behavior. See Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes ofAge, supra note 9, at 822 ("To these jurists, the idea of using their judicial
position to improve the accuracy of the law may appear to inappropriately trench on the
power of the legislature."). While that is certainly a reasonable conclusion (especially
given the court's formal pronouncements against policy making), the court's recent
activity, especially under the Chiefship of Judges Michel and Rader, suggests just the
opposite might be the case.
248. Crossing the Finish Line on Patent Reform: What Can and Should be Done?,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and the Internet,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of J. Paul R. Michel (Ret.)), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Michel02112011.pdf.
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and

court

operations." 24 9
However, as the Chief Judge of the court that hears all appeals
arising under the patent statutes, Judge Michel's public comments
regarding patent policy tended to be viewed as emanating from the
court. 25 0 Furthermore, none of the judges on the court ever publicly
contradicted or reprimanded the Chief Judge's public comments, nor
did any judge publicly question the propriety of the Chief Judge
speaking out on patent reform. Given the extent of his public
relations effort against patent reform (including repeatedly urging
patent litigators and patent holders to lobby Congress to remove the
damages and claim construction portions of the bill) and the lack of
public dissent from other members of the court, it would seem that
the court as a whole at least tacitly approved of the Chief Judge's
actions.
Additionally, the court created an "advisory group" that
monitored patent reform and advised the court on impending
legislative changes. 251 The precise role that this committee played at
the court is unclear, but its existence and presence at the court
suggests that the interest in patent reform extended beyond the Chief
Judge's chambers.
Nor has the court's direct advocacy of higher levels of
government ended with the retirement of Chief Judge Michel. The
new Chief Judge, Rader, has directly questioned the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the patent statute. In January 2013, in a keynote
address at the New York State Bar Association's annual meeting, he
derided the Supreme Court for its recent "activism" in patent law.252
Chief Judge Rader declared:
The problem is that the Supreme Court is not putting the
language of the [patent] statute in the proper context.... I see a
significant threat to the future of IP law, and that threat comes
249. Id.
250. Gene Quinn, An on the Record Interview with CAFC Judge Randall Rader,
IPWATCHDOG, INC. (Apr. 12, 2010, 4:09 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/04/12/anon-the-record-interview-with-cafc-judge-randall-rader/id=10115/ (recounting Judge Rader
explaining that a Chief Judge "is often asked to speak for the Court and makes an effort to
properly reflect the Court's viewpoints on things").
251. Judge Michel discussed the advisory group that "is advising on changes in the
patent law and, particularly, given the current circumstances, the pending legislation in the
Congress." See Michel, supranote 209, at 3.
252. Ryan Davis, Rader Calls Out High Court's 'Activism' in IP Law, LAW360 (Jan. 22,
2013, 8:11 PM), http://www.1aw360.comlarticles/408846/rader-calls-out-high-court-sactivism-in-ip-law.
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primarily from an incorrect desire to demand from the statute
more than it is designed to accomplish."
The new era of patent dialogue demonstrates a specialized
Federal Circuit that considers itself a partner with Congress and the
Supreme Court in setting patent law and policy. Indeed, Judge
Rader's comments demonstrate a belief that the Federal Circuit
should be the primary judicial actor in patent law.
IV. USING DIALOGUE TO LEVERAGE JUDICIAL EXPERTISE
This Article's focus on the Federal Circuit's dialogic relationship

with Congress and the Supreme Court has various normative
implications. First, it provides theorists interested in institutional

patent dynamics with another avenue of investigation. Attention to
dialogue involving the Federal Circuit provides a more complete
understanding of how institutions interact in shaping patent policy. In
particular, questions of comparative institutional analysis should take
into account an institution's ability to influence policy decisions
indirectly as well as directly.254 Discussions of whether policy
decisions are best handled by Congress, the Supreme Court, or the
Federal Circuit must therefore consider the ability for those
institutions to engage policy makers in dialogue. The relative policymaking competence of a given institution may increase through
dialogic interaction.

Appreciating the importance of dialogue can also prompt
scholars to think normatively about when Congress and the Supreme
Court should catalyze legal change through the Federal Circuit and
when those institutions should simply change the law unilaterally.
There is disagreement among scholars regarding the proper balance
of policy making between the various institutions. Some scholars have
argued for a limited congressional role in patent policy, 255 others for
limited Supreme Court intervention, 25 6 and others still for a more

253. Id.
254. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-4 (1994) (arguing for comparative
institutional analysis in order to understand law and public policy); Arti K. Rai, Engaging
Facts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1035, 1039 (2003) ("[P]atent reform requires multi-institutional analysis ... [which]
must also be comparative in nature.").
255. See Burk, supra note 16, at 20, 22 (arguing for congressional intervention only for
structural and administrative changes to the patent system); Nard, supra note 78, at 106-07
(arguing for a congressional role limited to procedural reform and correction legislation).
256. See Golden, supra note 6, at 709.
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prominent role for the Supreme Court. 257 This Article does not
provide the answer to that debate, but does suggest that debates
about institutional competence in policy making are incomplete
without consideration of the potential for dialogue among policy
makers. Furthermore, the iterative dialogic nature of patent policy
making described in this Article holds out the promise for an
improved process of crafting law. Harmonious dialogue between the
Federal Circuit, Congress, and the Supreme Court could potentially
leverage the benefits of specialization at the Federal Circuit while
muting some of the drawbacks inherent in a specialized court.
However, for dialogue to work, the Supreme Court and Congress
must engage each other regarding policy decisions more substantively
than that which currently occurs. This Part explores the normative
implications of patent dialogue by drawing on the theory of
specialized courts to demonstrate how a dialogic framework that
includes the Federal Circuit can improve policy decisions amongst all
of the branches.
A.

The Relationship Between Specialization and Quality
In general, specialization brings advantages of output and
efficiency-virtues that play a fundamental role in the organizational
structure of corporations and governments.258 Similarly, in the judicial
context, specialization is thought to increase quality and efficiency in
decision making. Lawrence Baum calls the advantages of judicial
specialization "neutral virtues": promoting legal uniformity,
increasing the quality of decision making, and increasing the
efficiency with which cases are disposed.2 59
But an apparent inconsistency exists in the literature on
specialization. Proponents of judicial specialization argue that
increased exposure to a particular subject area, like patent law, will
lead to judicial expertise. 26 This expertise, it is thought, leads to
higher quality decisions than a court of general jurisdiction would be
expected to produce.261 Thus, according to proponents of

257. See Janis, supra note 2, at 418-19 (proposing an increased "managerial model" for
the Supreme Court).
258. See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Growth Based on Increasing Returns Due to
Specialization, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 56, 56 (1987) ("The idea that increasing returns and
specialization are closely related is quite old.").
259. BAUM, supra note 26, at 32-33.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 33; Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43
ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330 (1991); David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, JudicialReview of
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specialization, the Federal Circuit should, on the whole, make higher
quality decisions than a non-specialized tribunal deciding patent

cases. 262
However, opponents of specialization argue the reverse: that
specialization leads to lower quality decision making. According to
specialization skeptics, judges who see only a small subset of cases are
more likely to suffer from "tunnel vision." 263 Because specialized
courts are not generalists, they will not be exposed to the full array of
legal thought and therefore will (1) have fewer legal tools from which
to craft doctrine and (2) aggrandize the importance of the doctrinal
area which they oversee. 26
This apparent inconsistency is not a minor point-debate about
the Federal Circuit's relative quality advantage is fundamental to
contemporary debates about the structure of the patent system.
Indeed, there are entire law review volumes devoted to this precise
debate.26 5
The disagreement in the literature about the relationship
between quality and specialization is, at its heart, a debate about the
value of expertise versus the value of more broad-based knowledge.
For specialization skeptics, the concern with low-quality decisions is a
concern about centralization, or more precisely, a concern about the
lack of generalization. Because generalization exposes courts to a
wide range of doctrines, theories, and decisions, courts of general
jurisdiction have a wider range of legal experience on which to draw
when rendering decisions. A bankruptcy judge, for instance, is
unlikely to be exposed to the types of legal arguments and theories
prevalent in civil rights disputes. Failing to encounter those
arguments and theories might lead to less efficient legal rules if
bankruptcy law is in need of new doctrine.

Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6768 (1975); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 378-79.
262. See BAUM, supra note 26, at 33; Bruff, supranote 261, at 330; Currie & Goodman,
supranote 261, at 67-68.
263. See COMM'N ON REVISION, supra note 88, at 234-35; Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, supra note 9, at 3; Ellen R. Jordan, Should
Litigants Have a Choice Between Specialized Courts and Courts of General Jurisdiction?,
66 JUDICATURE 14, 14-17 (1982); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw.
U. L. REV. 745, 766 (1981); Rai, supra note 11, at 880.
264. See supra note 263.
265. See generally Symposium, The FederalCircuit as an Institution, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 749 (2010) (addressing the judiciary and patent law); Symposium, The Federal
Circuit: The National Appellate Court Celebrationand Introspective Symposium, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 513 (2010) (addressing the Federal Circuit and patent reform).
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Furthermore, generalization has the virtue of exposing judges to
interrelationships among different legal areas. That same bankruptcy
judge may not fully internalize how bankruptcy law interacts with
patent law. 26 This might lead that judge to unknowingly make
decisions that further bankruptcy policy but are harmful to the patent
system. General exposure to law, it is thought, guards against this sort
of tunnel vision. 267 For generalists, the cost of acquiring deep
knowledge about a particular legal regime is not worth the cost of
sacrificing breadth of knowledge about law in general.26
Proponents of specialization take issue with the cost-benefit
analysis of generalists. For them, the deep knowledge of
specialization is worth sacrificing broad-based understanding of a
variety of legal fields. 269 This deep knowledge is considered
"expertise." The priority that specialization proponents grant to
judicial expertise makes perfect sense in today's modern specialized
world. Economists have shown the value of expertise that specialists
possess; businesses have harnessed the insights; and governments
have long been bastions of specialization. For proponents of
specialization, the value of expertise outweighs whatever costs accrue
from tunnel vision.
Of course, these tradeoffs are real. Specialized courts do, in fact,
gain valuable experience with repetition. However, they are exposed
to a narrower spectrum of legal thought. Thus, specialization can,
somewhat paradoxically, lead to both better decision making and
worse decision making at the same time: better decision making
because specialized courts have a better understanding of the nuances
of the particular area of law and how the various doctrines interact
and worse decision making because the decisions become divorced
from the broader legal landscape and lack legal innovations that
spring from other areas.
As applied to the Federal Circuit, expertise has led to increased
uniformity in the law. Rochelle Dreyfuss has noted that the Federal
Circuit "experiment" created a legal regime that is "more uniform,

266. For a discussion of this precise issue, see Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of
Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 735
(2007) (describing the significance of intellectual property law in bankruptcy).
267. See, e.g., Jordan, Should Litigants Have a Choice Between Specialized Courts and
Courts of GeneralJurisdiction?,supra note 263, at 15, 17.
268. See id. at 15.
269. See BAUM, supra note 26, at 54.
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easier to apply, and more responsive to national interests." 270 Those
achievements are largely the result of centralization and the
accompanying expertise gained through repetition. But the Federal
Circuit also suffers from problems associated with a lack of
generalized knowledge and experience: its jurisprudence is criticized
as overly formalistic, 27 1 and the court shows little interest in
understanding the larger policy implications of its rulings. 272 A
dissenting faction of the Supreme Court has recently articulated a
role in patent law in which it serves as a generalist check on the
Federal Circuit's focus on its own specialty.2 73 Indeed, recent Supreme
Court decisions often reprimand the Federal Circuit for deviating
from general principles of law and equity in crafting specialized rules
for patent law. 274 The tradeoff between expertise and tunnel vision is
a consistent problem for specialized courts, but a problem that can be
partially overcome through dialogue.
B.

Using Patent Dialogue to Leverage Expertise

In patent law, the gap between specialized knowledge and broad
knowledge of legal principles and policies can be bridged through
dialogue. The dialogue described in this Article takes advantage of

270. Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit:A Case Study in Specialized Courts,supra note 9, at
74; see also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The FederalCircuit's Licensing Law Jurisprudence:
Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 202 (2009) (concluding that the Federal
Circuit significantly influences intellectual property licensing law).
271. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2004); see also John R.
Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 (2003) ("In short,
the Federal Circuit has embraced an increasingly formal jurisprudence.").
272. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit
Comes of Age, supra note 9, at 827 (finding that the Federal Circuit has not succeeded "in
using its expertise to keep patent law responsive to changing technological facts and
emerging national interests"). Judges on the court have denied engaging with policy
decisions. See, e.g., Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court, 75 PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 22, 24 (2007) ("[N]ot once have we had a discussion as to what
direction the law should take .... That is because we are not a policy-making body. We
have just applied precedent as best we could determine it to the cases that have come
before us."); Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations:Guiding Principles as NavigationalAids,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 764-65 (2004) (rejecting the notion that the court should
have a "discussion of philosophy").
273. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138-39 (2006)
(Breyer J., dissenting) (dismissing writ of certiorari per curiam as improvidently granted).
274. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange. L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (holding
that the standard for injunctive relief in patent law was the same as that for other areas of
the law). See generally Holbrook, supra note 6, at 71-72 (listing cases in which the
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit and replaced that court's specialized doctrine
with a more general one).

1098

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

the expertise of the Federal Circuit, while at the same time stabilizing
the court's decisions with a broader vision of general legal principles
and national innovation policy objectives. In essence, dialogue
combines the specialization of the Federal Circuit with the broader
vision of the Supreme Court and Congress.
Consider the Federal Circuit's relationship with Congress. As
demonstrated during the passage of the AIA, Congress's actions can
catalyze reform at the Federal Circuit. 275 By proposing legislation,
Congress signals to the Federal Circuit that certain features of the
patent system are out of step with the needs of the innovation
community. Congress is much better positioned to make broad
innovation policy decisions because it is a democratically elected
body and therefore more attuned to the needs of all of its
constituents, not just patent holders. Thus, damage reform, venue
reform, and inequitable conduct reform occurred at the Federal
Circuit not because of academic or practitioner criticism, but rather
after Congress proposed reform to those areas of the law. Congress's
superior understanding of innovation policies outside of patent law,
data gathering capabilities, and broad constituency can reduce the
tunnel vision that afflicts the Federal Circuit. Ultimately, Congress's
general knowledge of legal relationships and specific knowledge of
interest-group dynamics provided a superior prism through which to
expose patent law's faults than did the expertise of the Federal
Circuit or outside critiques of the court.
This point about relative competence can be made with equal
force with respect to the dialogic roles of the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is not a court of general
jurisdiction because it hears a limited docket of its own choosing.276
However, the Court is clearly exposed to a wider variety of legal ideas
than the Federal Circuit. Thus, the Supreme Court often reverses the
Federal Circuit in an attempt to align the court's precedents with the
wider "legal landscape." 277 Indeed, a look at the Court's recent review
of Federal Circuit cases reveals a Court that often concludes that the
Federal Circuit has fallen prey to an overly formalistic tunnel
vision.278
In fact, the predominant view of the Supreme Court's patent
jurisprudence is consistent with how one might expect a generalist
275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra Part II.A.
See Golden, supra note 6, at 709.
See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 6, at 72.
See id. at 71-72.
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court to engage in dialogue with a specialist one. Many of the Court's
recent decisions can be read to stand for the principle that the Federal
Circuit had become too formalistic in its approach to various
doctrines. 279 Excessive formalism is a close relation of tunnel visionit results from the court's preference for clear, predictable rules
rather than equitable standards.2 80
For example, in eBay v. MercExchange81 the Supreme Court
overturned a long-standing Federal Circuit practice of near automatic
injunctive relief upon a finding of patent infringement. 282 The Court
replaced the Federal Circuit's formalistic rule with a multi-factor,
equitable standard. 283 This move-from rules to standards-has been
a favorite of the Supreme Court when reviewing Federal Circuit
cases. 28 4 Peter Lee has noted that the formalism of Federal Circuit
patent law and the holistic nature of Supreme Court patent law can
be explained by the courts' specialized and general natures,
respectively."
Dialogue between the two courts holds out the promise of the
best of both worlds-clear rules for the patent system (coming from
the Federal Circuit) with a generalist Supreme Court intervening
when formalism has come at the expense of good policy. Of course,
for this to occur there needs to be some give and take in the dialogue,
whereas eBay largely just corrected the Federal Circuit's overly
formalistic doctrine without providing opportunity for the lower court
to respond. Other cases have provided the court with a better
opportunity to respond to signals from the Supreme Court.
For example, recall the dialogue between the Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit regarding the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter.2 86 After the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari as
improvidently granted in LabCorp, the Federal Circuit responded to
the Court's signal by granting en banc review of In re Bilski.287 The
Federal Circuit's opinion in Bilski articulated a new test for patent

279. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 271, at 774.
280. Peter Lee, PatentLaw and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 39,77 (2010).
281. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
282. Id. at 392; see also Lee, supra note 280, at 39 ("[I]f infringement, then
injunction.").
283. eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
284. Lee, supra note 280, at 82.
285. See id. at Part VI.
286. See supraPart II.B.
287. 545 F.3d 943,949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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eligibility: to be eligible for patenting, a method must involve a
machine or transform matter from one state to another.288
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that
the court's machine-or-transformation rule was not the only test for
patent eligibility." Unlike in eBay, however, the Court did not
provide a clear replacement for the Federal Circuit's incorrect legal
rule.2 90 Instead, the Supreme Court accepted the Federal Circuit's rule
as a "clue" in determining patent eligibility and reiterated a longstanding, policy-like standard to guide the patent-eligibility inquiry:
abstract ideas are not eligible for patenting.29'
The Bilski decision allowed the Supreme Court to avoid
articulating a specific legal rule governing § 101 inquiries and thus
allowed the Federal Circuit to craft such a rule in the first instance. In
essence, the Supreme Court asked the Federal Circuit to "try again."
In order to allow the Federal Circuit to fulfill this request, the
Supreme Court simultaneously decided to grant, vacate, and remand
a companion case with instructions to the Federal Circuit to
reconsider the case in light of Bilski.29
That case, Prometheus Laboratories,Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services,293 was yet another opportunity for the Federal Circuit to
craft patent-eligibility doctrine in response to actions from the
Supreme Court. The patent at issue in the case covered a method of
determining the proper dosage of a drug based on certain metabolic
levels in the patient.294 The Federal Circuit had initially held that the
method was patent eligible based on its machine-or-transformation
test because the method involved a transformation of the drug once
metabolized in the patient's body.295 On remand, the Federal Circuit
reissued a nearly identical opinion. 296 Although the Supreme Court
had rejected the machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit
continued to use the test as a clue to patentability.2 97 More

288.
289.
290.
(2011).
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 956.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3218 (2010).
See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318-19
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012).
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1349.
Id.
Id.
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fundamentally, the court found that the method was not an abstract
idea. 298 Thus, the method was patent-eligible. 2 99
In a surprising dialogic twist, the Supreme Court again granted
Mayo's certiorari petition." This time, the Court rejected the patent
as an unpatentable law of nature. 01 Interestingly, the Court seemed
more interested in continuing the dialogue regarding § 101 with
Congress, and not the Federal Circuit:
[W]e must hesitate before departing from established general
legal rules lest a new protective rule that seems to suit the needs
of one field produce unforeseen results in another. And we
must recognize the role of Congress in crafting more finely
tailored rules where necessary.302
One aspect of the Supreme Court's patent case law that has
frustrated commentators is its tendency to reverse the Federal
Circuit's formalistic rules while failing to supply a doctrinal
replacement.3 03 But it is precisely such rulings that allow the Supreme
Court to leverage the lower court's expertise via dialogue. The
Supreme Court can signal areas in which the court's specialization has
resulted in ossified or misguided doctrines while leaving the details of
doctrinal clean-up to the Federal Circuit.
Dialogue has the potential to improve patent policy decisionmaking by allowing the Federal Circuit to use its experience and
expertise to craft legal rules in response to policy signals while the
Supreme Court and Congress leverage their broader knowledge and
experience with various legal regimes to signal to the court when its
rules have become unworkable. The recent dialogic experiences
demonstrate that while dialogue can improve policy, as it has in the
area of damages and venue, it is not a cure-all. Continuing confusion
over patent-eligibility may suggest that another policy makerperhaps Congress or the executive3 0"-is required.
298. Id. at 1342.
299. Id. at 1350.
300. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3027 (2011)
(mem.).
301. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012).
302. Id. at 1305.
303. See Lemley et al., supra note 290, at 1316 (finding that despite the Supreme
Court's rejection of the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test of patent eligibility,
courts continue to rely on the test in the absence of a Supreme Court-supplied
alternative); Menell, supra note 28, at 1305 ("The only definitive ruling in [Bilski v.
Kappos] is that the Patent Act does not categorically exclude business methods.").
304. See Rai, supra note 4, at 1240-41 (describing recent executive branch involvement
in the Myriad litigation involving patent-eligibility of DNA). Significant confusion over
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The Future of Dialogue

A number of changes could improve patent dialogue and more
effectively leverage the specialization of the Federal Circuit, the
broader policy perspectives of Congress, and the general legal
knowledge of the Supreme Court. First, Congress and the Supreme
Court should increase policy communication amongst themselves,
while continuing to engage with the Federal Circuit. As detailed in
Part I, dialogic relationships between the Supreme Court and
Congress have been well documented in areas outside of patent
law. 05 Regarding patent law, however, Congress and the Supreme
Court have at times been reluctant to engage with one another.
For instance, patent-eligible subject matter doctrine provides a
perfect opportunity for the two institutions to engage in a
constructive dialogue about the patentability of business methods. As
described above, the Supreme Court's Bilski decision rejected the
machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test for patent
eligibility."* Although the patentability decision was unanimous, the
two concurrences took up the issue of whether a wholesale ban on
business methods was appropriate.3 07
Much of the internal debate in Bilski turned on arguments about
legislative history. In 1999, Congress passed the First Inventor
Defense Act" ("FIDA") to limit the exposure of the financial
community to the flood of business method patents expected to be
issued following the Federal Circuit's State Street Bank decision.3 09 In
Bilski, a majority of Justices found that FIDA demonstrated
congressional recognition of the patentability of business methods:
"A conclusion that business methods are not patentable in any
circumstances would render [FIDA] meaningless." 10 In concurrence,
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's reasoning: "It is
apparent, both from the content and history of the Act, that Congress

the scope of patent-eligible subject matter exists not just from practitioners, but at the
Federal Circuit itself. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed.
Cir.) (en banc), cert granted 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (issuing a per curiam opinion in an en
banc patent-eligibility case because no majority opinion could be reached).
305. Supra Part I.A.
306. See supranote 289 and accompanying text.
307. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231-59 (2010).
308. First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-555
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012)).
309. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
310. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228.
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did not in any way ratify" the Federal Circuit's decision to allow
business methods to be patented. 1 '
Discussion of congressional policy views regarding business
method patenting is precisely the sort of policy discussion that should
be occurring between the Supreme Court and Congress. The Federal
Circuit has made numerous attempts to craft effective tests for
determining patent-eligible subject matter, but as yet has been
unsuccessful. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has tried to fix the problem
of business methods-and § 101 patent-eligibility more generallynumerous times since Bilski, with poor results. 312 Instead, it may have
been more helpful for the Supreme Court to directly invite Congress
to opine on the eligibility of business method patents.
The Court's choice not to reach out to Congress in Bilski was
especially odd given the Court's willingness to do so in other cases.
313
For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership,
the
Court upheld the traditional standard of clear and convincing
evidence needed in order to invalidate an issued patent. Despite
numerous empirical and theoretical arguments against that
standard,314 the Court refused to adopt Microsoft's alternative.
Instead, the Court pushed the issue to Congress, stating that "[a]ny
re-calibration of the standard of proof remains in [Congress's]
hands."" Congress has not to this point, however, shown any interest
in revisiting the issue.
Congress has engaged directly with the Supreme Court in other
areas of patent law. During the legislative patent reform period,
Congress proposed to repeal 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), the provision that
creates infringement liability for supplying a component of a patented
product abroad. 1 6 In 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Microsoft Corp. v. A T&T," a case involving application of the
threatened statute."' While the case was pending before the Court,
311. Id. at 3250 (Stevens, J., concurring).
312. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en
banc decision with seven separate written decisions and no majority opinion); Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., 689 F.3d 1303, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir.
2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) (reversing the Federal Circuit's long-standing
rule permitting patenting of DNA).
313. 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
314. See generally Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45 (2007) (arguing that the unreliability of early
patent review should weigh against judicial deference to the patent system).
315. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. at 2252.
316. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5(f) (2006).
317. 550 U.S. 437 (2007).

318. Id. at 437.
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Congress removed any mention of § 271(f) from the Patent Reform
Act of 2007 because "the provision is currently pending before the
Supreme Court. If the Court does not resolve that issue, we will
revisit it in the legislative process."3 19 Thus, Congress responded to
the Court's action and explicitly engaged the Court in dialogic terms.
Patent dialogue can be further improved through a more robust
dialogic role for the executive branch. Recent actions by the
executive branch suggest that a wider dialogue regarding patent
reform involving all three branches of government is possible. Indeed,
Arti Rai has catalogued various examples of the executive branch's
increasing interest in patent reform.320 While many of those examples
to date have occurred only when an executive agency has an interest
in the outcome of a particular case, her work suggests that executive
branch involvement in patent reform extends beyond the PTO.32 1
Recently, all three branches of government have expressed a
desire to eliminate patent trolls. No fewer than six bills directed at
patent trolls are currently circulating on Capitol Hill.322 On June 3,
2013, President Obama announced a series of executive orders
designed to limit frivolous patent lawsuits by entities that "hijack
somebody else's idea and see if they can extort some money. "323 In
the very next day's edition of the New York Times, Chief Judge
Rader of the Federal Circuit urged district court judges to punish
patent trolls through attorney fee shifting rules.3 24 There is general
consensus that patent trolls need to be controlled, but, at this point,
no obvious solution exists to achieve that goal. However, the interest
319. Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch, Berman and Smith
Introduce Bicameral, Bipartisan Patent Reform Legislation (Apr. 18, 2007), available at
http://votesmart.org/public-statement/254893/leahy-hatch-berman-and-smith-introducebicameral-bipartisan-patent-reform-legislation#.UtmaYBAo5D8; see also Thomas, supra
note 94, at 215-18 (discussing the dialogue between Congress and the judiciary on the
issue of patent law).
320. See generally Rai, supra note 4 (discussing trends in executive agency involvement
in the development of patent policy).
321. Id. at 1239-40.
322. Stopping Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent
Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse
Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R.
2024, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013);
Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th
Cong. (2013).
323. Rader, Chien & Hricik, supra note 237; see Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders
Regulators to Root Out 'Patent Trolls,' N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-to-curb-patent-suits.html.
324. See Rader, Chien, & Hricik, supra note 237 (encouraging district judges to use
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 35 U.S.C. § 285 to punish patent trolls).
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of all three branches in eliminating abusive patent litigation practices
provides hope of a robust dialogue that may result in better solutions
to the problem than the Federal Circuit has been able to craft on its
own up to this point.
Another way to increase the effectiveness of dialogue is via
increased use of low-cost reform catalysts. When the Supreme Court
grants certiorari, it sends a clear signal to the Federal Circuit. But it
also requires the Supreme Court to make a first attempt at crafting
the law.325 There are likely to be instances in which the Supreme
Court wants to send a signal to the Federal Circuit but would prefer
that the lower court make the first attempt at reform. Instead of
issuing an opinion which requires the parties to devote considerable
time and effort to brief and argue the case and requires the Justices to
prepare for argument and issue an opinion, the Court might consider
increased reliance on dissents from denials of certiorari. Such dissents
occur in other legal areas, but rarely in patent law.326 They represent a
low-cost method of signaling areas of legal concern of at least a
portion of the Justices. History suggests that the Federal Circuit
would respond.
Congress also has lower-cost means of signaling needed patent
reform to the Federal Circuit. Crafting and proposing legislation is a
costly business. It requires time and effort of congressional staffers
and political capital. Indeed, some scholars have begun to question
the overall value of legislative-judicial dialogue in the modern era of
political polarization.3 27
In spite of scholarly skepticism, Congress can send policy signals
to the Federal Circuit which do not require legislative proposals. For
instance, Congress can improve its oversight capabilities regarding
patent law in order to better supervise the policy-like functions that
the Federal Circuit exercises when it crafts patent law. An initial step
towards this goal would be to increase institutional knowledge of the
Federal Circuit's decisions. This informational step is critical in the
325. But see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125
(2006) (dismissing the Court's grant of certiorari as improvidently granted). Golden calls
this approach "less than ideal." Golden, supra note 6, at 707. I agree with Golden, but
issuing dissents from denials of certiorari seems less problematic and just as likely to
generate a response from the Federal Circuit.
326. See, e.g., Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504, 504-06 (2012) (mem.) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Utah Highway Patrol Assn. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132
S. Ct. 12, 12-23 (2011) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
327. Hasen, supra note 40, at 210 (finding that due to "increased polarization[,1"
congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents "have
become exceedingly rare").
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dialogic process. Congress tends to ignore most appellate courts,
deferring supervision of those courts to the Supreme Court.3 28 But in
an area like patent law in which the appellate court does much of the
policy work, Congress must remain abreast of developments at the
appellate level. Congress has recently taken steps in this direction by
holding hearings to review recent judicial decisions on patent law.329
Second, during nomination proceedings, Senators and
Congressmen can engage potential jurists on substantive patent law
topics. Although nomination proceedings for circuit court judges are
often ceremonial 33 0-particularly for an obscure court like the Federal
Circuit-more active engagement with future members of the bench
could increase communication between the legislative and judicial
branches at relatively low cost.
Lastly, Congress could increase its public comments about patent
policy. While Congress is a group of individuals with often widely
differing viewpoints, surprising consensus can be reached about
various patent policies, if not the specific legal changes needed. For
instance, Senators and Representatives from across the political
spectrum have recently introduced various bills aimed at combating
abusive litigation practices of non-practicing entities, or patent
trolls.' While the Federal Circuit is almost certain to respond to the
pending bills, it likely would have been as quick to respond to public
comments from Representatives and Senators about the patent troll
problem.

328. See ROBERT KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 80 (1997) ("[Llegislators and
staffs are often not aware of relevant appellate statutory opinions ... and judges may not
even be conscious of the effects of their work on congressional decisionmaking."); Stefanie
A. Lindquist & David A. Yalof, Congressional Responses to Federal Circuit Court
Decisions, 85 JUDICATURE 61, 61 (2001).
329. See, e.g., Hearing on Review of Recent Judicial Decisions on Patent Law before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2011) (statement of Dan L. Burk, Chancellor's
Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine), available at http://judiciary.house.gov
/_files/hearings/pdf/BurkO3102011.pdf. Lobbyists supply Congress with a large amount of
its information, as well. See generally Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
CongressionalOversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Firm Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 165 (1984) (arguing that Congress's typical form of oversight is effective, despite
appearing uninterested). Weighing interest-group priorities is a function much better
suited for a legislature than a court.
330. William G. Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees During the
Senate Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 119, 119 (2001).
331. Senators Chuck Schumer and John Cornyn (R-Tex.) and Representatives Peter
DeFazio (D-Or.), Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah), and Ted Deutch (D-Fla.) have all introduced
bills aimed at patent trolls. See supra note 322.
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CONCLUSION

Patent dialogue represents a promising avenue for improving
patent law making among the legislative, judicial, and executive
branches, yet one that will require continued input from the Supreme
Court and Congress in order to improve the patent system. Like
traditional dialogic interactions between Congress and the courts,
dialogue in patent law rejects the notion that any particular institution
is the final arbiter of the law; rather, dialogue involves a complex and
continuous set of interactions designed to ultimately align the law
with policy goals. But patent dialogue offers virtues beyond those in
traditional dialogic interactions. First, patent dialogue situates the
initial task of doctrine making in an expert body: the Federal Circuit.
Congress and the Supreme Court can (and often do) leave the
crafting of particular patent doctrines to the Federal Circuit. Allowing
the Federal Circuit to craft law in the first instance frees Congress and
the Supreme Court to act more broadly: instead of focusing on
detailed legal rules in an area of law with which they are unfamiliar,
those institutions can instead focus on coordinating national
innovation policy goals.
Second, patent dialogue leverages the Supreme Court's
generalist legal expertise and Congress's democratic responsiveness
in order to improve the decision making of the Federal Circuit. By
signaling reform priorities, Congress and the Supreme Court can alert
the Federal Circuit when its precedents have become outdated, run
counter to policy objectives, or detrimentally conflict with general
principles of law and equity. The Federal Circuit has been quick to
respond to such policy signals, even though it has been reluctant to
respond to similar calls for reform from academics and practitioners.
Third, engaging the Federal Circuit in dialogue empowers the
court to improve the functioning of the patent system. The Federal
Circuit has demonstrated a willingness to alter its case law as well as a
willingness to more closely monitor procedural issues at district courts
when Congress and the Supreme Court indicate such actions are
needed. The court has also begun to instruct district court judges
about policy goals and doctrinal means of achieving those goals.
Moreover, the court has recently increased its use of the en banc
process. All of these beneficial aspects of recent Federal Circuit
practice were initiated in response to signals from Congress or the
Supreme Court. The court's feeling of empowerment, however, has
also led to less desirable results, such as direct lobbying of Congress
and even the Supreme Court. An interbranch dialogue on patent
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policy that includes the Federal Circuit is a promising development
for the patent system, but a development that must be closely
monitored by the Supreme Court and Congress if it is to fulfill its
promise.

